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Pre–World War II Japan, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, was a 
nation with a strong military force, growing economy, and unique ethnic identity. 
Contemporary China exhibits similar characteristics in the first part of the twenty-first 
century. Culture, language, geography, military force, economy, and religion, to name only 
a few, are frequently referred to by scholars as sources for uniting people under the banner 
of nationalism. Oftentimes, a mix of these aspects helps to establish national unity and 
identity. Were Japan’s military, economy, and culture the main drivers of Japanese 
nationalism before 1945, and are these same factors driving Chinese nationalism today? 
After comparing similarities between Japanese and Chinese nationalism and the roles the 
military, economy, and culture play as primary drivers for building national unity, this 
thesis finds that Japan’s military in the early twentieth century primarily drove national 
unity, with ethnic racism and economy as close supplementary factors. China’s economy, 
on the other hand, has been the primary factor for building national unity today. Japan’s 
interaction with the League of Nations and China’s One Belt, One Road initiative and 
interaction with regional institutions greatly influenced each state’s primary driving factor. 
Where Japan’s approach to nationalism failed in interaction with international institutions, 
China has succeeded, and a united China may very well be the next East Asian hegemon. 
Will Chinese nationalism result in war? 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Japan’s power and prestige in East Asia rapidly 
grew. Japan’s military defeat of the great regional powers of the time, China and Russia, 
and its booming economy, contributed to unifying the Japanese people under a nationalist 
umbrella, resulting in a more homogenous identity. At the same time, Japanese leaders 
sought equal recognition by other great world powers on the international stage, such as 
Great Britain and the United States, especially by joining institutions like the League of 
Nations (LoN). 
Today, China exhibits relatively similar patterns. It boasts one of the largest 
military forces in the world, which continues to grow and modernize. China’s economy 
has experienced extraordinary GDP growth for the past two decades. In addition, China 
has set forth policy to economically unify East Asia with Eurasia and Africa and has joined 
multiple regional institutions in an effort to project its influence. However, while China 
continues to show signs of military and economic growth for the foreseeable future, its 
leaders struggle to promote and strengthen a coherent and unified nationalist identity. 
China’s growth places it at the forefront of becoming a great power and potentially ousting 
the United States as the East Asian hegemon without going to war. 
To better understand China’s current foreign policy posture toward both East Asian 
nations and the United States, this thesis explores similarities between Japanese and 
Chinese nationalism and asks the following question. Were Japan’s military, economy, and 
culture the main drivers of Japanese nationalism before 1945, and are these same factors 
driving Chinese nationalism today? 
 2 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
For hundreds of years, China was the center of the Orient. Countries from all around 
the region would pay homage to the great empire. 1  Then, foreigners from the West 
challenged the Chinese state and its tributary system. In an instant, “gunboat diplomacy” 
destroyed China and its image of being the most advanced nation in the world. For nearly 
a century, the people of China lived under a dreary period of humiliation and degradation. 
They were forced to trade with Western merchants at unfair prices, and they lost territory 
to the Russians, Germans, French, British, and Japanese.2 However, for the last twenty 
years, China has exhibited consistent military and economic growth, generating a renewed 
focus on the Asia–Pacific region by U.S. leaders and experts.3 China’s economic successes 
and its large military have begun to embolden its leaders to challenge the status quo, 
furthering its military, industrial, and diplomatic power and influence. Arguably, behind 
this power is the driving force of nationalism and identity and the potential will to become 
the regional powerhouse China once was before its “century of humiliation.” 
Nationalism drives power and foreign policy and much can be learned through a 
historical analysis of nations that have shown similar characteristics as they rise to a 
position of regional hegemony. For example, Japan’s ethnic identity grew very strong from 
the turn of the twentieth century throughout the following four decades. Japan’s military 
played a leading role in engendering that nationalist identity. Possibly, Japan’s growing 
nationalism helped trigger the United States’ entrance into the Second World War with the 
                                                 
1 William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 133–135. See also Joseph W. Esherick, “China and the World: From Tribute to 
Treaties to Popular Nationalism,” in China’s Rise in Historical Perspective, ed. Brantly Womack 
(Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 19–21. 
2 Esherick, “China and the World,” 30–31. 
3 For example, USPACOM Commander, Admiral Harry B. Harris, stated in his 2018 Pacific 
Command Posture Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, “While the United States has an 
economic relationship with China, in my opinion, our two nations are in clear competition for influence and 
control of the Indo-Pacific. As the President commented in his recent State of the Union Address, China is 
now our ‘rival’…Beijing is using its military and economic power to coerce its neighbors and erode the 
free and open international order.” See Harry B. Harris, Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. 
Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific 
Command Posture (Washington, DC: White House, February 14, 2018), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf. 
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bombing of Pearl Harbor. If China’s nationalism grows the same as Japan’s grew, could 
we also expect a similar reaction from contemporary China? Many scholars have shown 
that nationalism is often an underlying principle that leads states to act a certain way or 
pursue certain policies abroad. Therefore, nationalist beliefs and conduct can provide 
indicators for aggressive behavior directed from one state to another. For the Japanese, 
strong and unified national identity led, ultimately, to war because of racism. 
Chinese nationalism has been and continues to be a fraught issue. The ability to 
address many opposing domestic issues under a single political party alone invites 
contention and dissuades national unity. Therefore, modern Chinese leaders, such as Mao 
Zedong, Chiang Kai-Shek, and Xi Jinping, have sought the best ways in which to unite the 
vastly populated and ethnically diverse state. Understanding the power of nationalism, or 
national unity, in China may better help U.S. policymakers gauge whether the state is more 
likely to engage in aggressive behavior, like Japan, when conducting diplomacy over 
contentious Chinese core territorial interests, such as Taiwan, and economic interests such 
as the South China Sea (SCS) and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  
Economic needs directed leaders in the past to advance expansionist foreign 
policies. Raw resources found on mainland Asia were crucial for Japan to feed its people, 
sustain a growing economy, and modernize its military. Japan’s defeat of China in the First 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, followed by the subsequent defeat of the powerful Russia 
during the Russo–Japanese War in 1905, marked a turning point for Japan and its apparent 
destiny for greatness.4 Shortly thereafter, Japan’s territorial expansion to mainland Asia 
provided Japan free access to resources and markets it did not previously have and a 
newfound purpose for its mighty military. In fact, Russia’s defeat may have validated the 
importance of institutionalizing the patriotism that was transparent in Japan’s educational 
and religious texts. Japanese leaders capitalized on trending military successes and used 
this newfound military power to inspire nationalism among Japanese citizens. Japanese 
                                                 
4 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 94–97. 
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leaders were then able to maintain a high level of national unity for the next four decades 
as Japan’s economy grew and territory expanded.5 
Like Japan used, China, too, uses proof of economic growth and military power to 
inspire nationalism among its citizens. However, compared to Japan, economic growth has 
arguably been a greater driver for Chinese nationalism than has the military. Using regional 
institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), China spreads nationalism for the purposes 
of pursuing the central government’s core interests and foreign policies. China also 
attempts to use these forums in order to justify Chinese expansion, especially within the 
SCS, and to replace the United States and its influence by becoming the regional hegemon. 
Institutions have served as a channel for expanding both Japanese and Chinese 
nationalism. Pre-WWII Japan attempted to use international organizations, such as the 
LoN, to strengthen its national identity as a great power. Likewise, China uses regional 
security and economic institutions as a means to appease neighboring states and spread 
Chinese nationalism. China has also established financial institutions to support its goal of 
economic stability and enhance national unity. 
Through meticulous comparison, this paper aims to determine whether or not 
contemporary Chinese nationalism parallels, in any way, drivers prevalent in Japan’s rise 
to status of a regional power and if or how Chinese foreign policy decisions are influenced 
by nationalism as China itself appears to rise in power and hegemonic status. If these same 
factors are driving Chinese nationalism today, then leaders may be able to anticipate a 
greater increase in Chinese aggression. On the other hand, if these factors are less 
influential, non-existent, or not driving nationalist identity, then leaders might expect to 
find a lesser likelihood of China exerting aggressive foreign policy actions than Japan did, 
making relations with China less likely, because of China’s nationalism, in war. 
                                                 
5 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 55. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is divided into three main sections with the first section 
focusing on nationalism in general and the relationship between nationalism and 
hegemony. Because nationalism has been defined with several variations, I will define it 
here as a collective feeling by a community of people to achieve a common goal that they 
believe is in the best of interests for the group as a whole. As a nation gains power and 
influence, whether through military or economic success, leaders build on that success to 
motivate the people with a desire to excel even more. Leaders can also inspire the people 
to believe they are a great and powerful nation in the world. One tool that leaders 
commonly employ to encourage this feeling and belief of greatness is national unity. Thus, 
the collective actions of a unified people contribute to nationalism and that nation 
becoming a hegemon. The second section explores how Japan’s military, economy, and 
culture created national unity, which, in turn, drove nationalism and foreign policy during 
the first half of the twentieth century. The third section examines these same factors as 
potential drivers of Chinese nationalism and foreign policy. In addition, it examines how 
the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and regional institutions China participates in today 
influence contemporary Chinese foreign policy specifically toward the United States and 
East Asia and what implications these might have on regional hegemony. 
1. Nationalism 
A growing body of literature has examined the formation of nations and of 
nationalism, with most scholars of the subject (Renan, Gellner, Breuilly, Hobsbawm, and 
Anderson) agreeing that nations are created by nationalism and are therefore a phenomena 
of the modern era. Most leading scholars in the field also tend to concur that the modern 
era followed the French Revolution. Most modernists believe that nationalism is a product 
of a series of political, scientific, and industrial revolutions.6 However, scholars disagree 
on what factors contribute to the formation of a national identity and ongoing nationalism. 
                                                 
6 Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac, introduction to When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding 
of Theories of Nationalism, ed. Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac (New York: Routledge, 2005), 4. 
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Major conflicting factors believed to construct national identity include ethnicity, race, 
language, economics, religion, geography, and military requisites. 
One school of thought, “liberal nationalism,” describes nationalism as something 
spiritual in nature, though not necessarily religiously based, because it is established on 
adherence to a common set of liberal values. In his essay “What is a Nation,” Ernest Renan, 
one of the first influential French philosophers on nationalism, asserts that a nation is 
comprised of a people’s shared memories and “desire to live together.”7 He notes that the 
“essence of a nation” comprises not only of the commonalities among individuals, but also 
of things forgotten.8 For example, the conquering Germans in the fifth century lost their 
Germanic language as their concubines from the conquered nations bore their children.9 
Over time, descendants from these conquering Germans would form the nation of France, 
though few would remember such a history. In the annals of history, violence and brutality 
are often forgotten.10 Renan disagrees with ethnicity having any part in the formation of a 
modern nation, citing multiple examples across Europe where there exists a mixture of 
races, languages, and ethnic populations in a given modern nation (e.g., France, Germany, 
Italy, Great Britain).11 He likewise disagrees with the proposition that geography and 
natural borders are defining factors of a nation because cartographic lines can change and 
not all mountains and rivers divide nations from one another.12 Rather, nationalism, as a 
spiritual principle, is a product of shared feelings of past sacrifice by a community and of 
a willingness to sacrifice together in the future.13 Liberal nationalists are committed to 
basic liberal values, such as freedom, equality, and individual rights, because these values 
create a shared desire, an inclusivity and shared commitment by the people and for the 
people. 
                                                 
7 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?,” in Becoming National, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 52. 
8 Renan, “What is a Nation?,” 45. 
9 Ibid., 44. 
10 Ibid., 45. 
11 Ibid., 50. 
12 Ibid., 51–52. 
13 Ibid., 53. 
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Another school of thought claims that nationalism forms through a complex process 
of social transformation. Miroslav Hroch does not entirely disagree with the modernist 
orthodoxy that nations are created by nationalism. However, he argues that nationalism 
and the spread of “national ideas” requires specific social settings and certain “objective 
preconditions.” 14  Economic, political, religious, cultural, linguistic, geographic, and 
historical social settings coalesced over time with “collective consciousness” to form the 
nation. 15  Hroch traces nation-forming evolution with social transformations through 
national movements. Such movements are often comprised of patriotic groups with 
individuals whose professions provided greater social mobility.16 Additionally, national 
movements included literacy and education as a means for transmitting nationalist ideas.17 
Without social mobility and the ability to communicate ideas of nationalism, it would have 
been very difficult to recruit and motivate others to participate in the movement and cause 
to form a nation. 
Ernest Gellner also supports the theory of nationalism forming through 
industrialization. In his theoretical essay, “The Coming of Nationalism and Its 
Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class,” Gellner uses a theoretical model to argue 
how the role of culture and structure differs between an agro-literate society and an 
advanced industrial society. In an agro-literate society, social rank status is inherently far 
more significant than culture because “culture divides rather than unifies.”18 Furthermore, 
writing and literacy in this type of society is limited, dividing members who acquire 
information, ideas, and knowledge through working the land and by daily interaction with 
family, neighbors and employers, from individuals who are privileged to an education 
                                                 
14 Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building 
Process in Europe,” in Becoming National, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 61. 
15 Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation,” 61. 
16 Ibid., 67. 
17 Ibid., 68. 
18 Ernest Gellner, “The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and 
Class,” in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (New York: Verso, 1996), 104. 
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provided by full-time specialists.19 It is this intellectual divide that creates a cultural rift—
a sort of high and low culture—that defines societal structure and hierarchy in an agro-
literate society. Therefore, Gellner concludes that it is unlikely for shared culture in an 
agro-literate society to engender any form of a nation-state, or nationalism. 
An advanced industrial society, on the other hand, requires a unified, educated, and 
“standardized high culture” 20  to function. All members of this society co-operate to 
provide sustained economic growth, which, according to Gellner, is the “first principle of 
legitimacy of this kind of society.”21 Sustained growth requires innovation, innovation 
requires technical understanding and education, and technical understanding and education 
allow for members of this society to share a common “high” culture that is disciplined and 
systematized. To ensure sustained growth prevails, a nation-state is formed. As individuals 
self-identify with this common culture, they will actively participate in the institutions 
provided by the nation for that culture, strengthening and promoting their nationalist 
identity and nationalism. 
Still, other scholars of nationalism identify with the belief that nationalism is more 
ethnicity-based where individuals share a common heritage, language, and culture, as 
opposed to some civic or political membership. Anthony D. Smith explores a variety of 
academic writings proffered by historians. He argues that for hundreds of years, ethnic 
communities, or ethnies, have been socially and culturally structured in many parts of the 
world, sharing common elements of nationalism that form modern nation-states.22 Ethnic 
nationalism creates nations based on familial lineage, or nations in which common blood 
determines nationality. Smith defines this ethnic nationalism as a “demotic” or “vertical” 
ethnie and one that is more exclusive.23 On the other hand, nationalism that centers on 
political membership, or civic nationalism, tends to be “lateral” and is inclusive because 
                                                 
19 Gellner, “The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation,” 102–03. 
20 Ibid., 107. 
21 Ibid., 105. 
22 Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” in Becoming National, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. 
Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 109–10. 
23 Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” 112. 
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an individual belongs to a nation in which he is born.24 For Smith, ethnic nationalism 
requires some “core networks of association and culture,” such as language, religion, or 
historic territory.25 Failure to recognize these historically enduring, shared communal 
commonalities prevents us from fully comprehending the process of modern state 
formation. 
2. Japanese Nationalism 
The second section of this literature review examines military, cultural, and 
economic factors that drove Japanese nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Japanese superiority toward Americans, Europeans, and other East Asian nations affected 
their attitude, policy, and manner in which they fought in war. Discourses of national 
greatness effectively communicated nationalism as well as promoted national unity 
growth.26 
Japanese discourse on national greatness was prominent throughout the nation 
because of various institutions and social settings. Japan’s military was praised for its 
victories and territorial acquisition. Industrial expositions provided the social backdrop for 
communicating Japanese greatness.27 The emperor himself, along with members of the 
imperial family, attended expositions, 28  suggesting high importance in recognizing 
Japanese progress and becoming a rising world power. In “The Discourse of National 
Greatness in Japan, 1890–1919,” Sandra Wilson examines various dialogues on Japanese 
national greatness, its limitations, and consequences that contributed to further 
development of Japanese nationalism. From the 1880s and forward, some Japanese 
intellectuals believed that Japan had already established a sense of national pride and 
cultural identity because of its rich history and cultural heritage. 29  However, others 
                                                 
24 Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” 112. 
25 Ibid., 108. 
26 Sandra Wilson, “The Discourse of National Greatness in Japan, 1890–1919,” Japanese Studies 25, 
no. 1 (2005): 42, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10371390500067652. 
27 Wilson, “The Discourse of National Greatness in Japan,” 39. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 37. 
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believed Japan did not achieve true nation-state status and unquestionable nationalism until 
after its “military victories and territorial acquisition.”30 Possibly more than any other 
driver, Japan’s rapid imperial expansion resulted from its military successes over China in 
the First Sino-Japanese War, and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. 
Alongside the military driving Japanese nationalism, culture and ethnicity 
influenced how Japanese leaders viewed themselves in comparison with neighboring states 
and powerful Western nations. Cultural relationships with foreign nations are apparent in 
literature produced by the state and are arguably one the most influential forms of creating 
national unity. In War Without Mercy, John Dower investigates the relationship between 
race and power during the war in Asia in the early 1940s. Dower’s research draws upon 
the political language, imagery, and propaganda that made racism a driver in the conduct 
of war in Asia and explains the evolving relationship between Japan and the United States. 
As Dower notes, “In the war in Asia—and in general—considerations of race and power 
are inseparable.”31 Japanese Soldiers were told some thousands of arrogant, white men 
were ruling over millions of oppressed Asian natives and it was Japan’s duty to liberate the 
oppressed East Asians because they were of similar blood and color. 32  Nationalist 
propaganda led Japanese people to believe they would win the war because the Western 
culture was weak and selfish and their soldiers would not be willing to fight a protracted 
war in some far away land.33 Racial hatred was evident through actions such as “massacres 
of noncombatants, maltreatment and killing of prisoners, routinized torture, forced labor, 
and institutional murder in the form of lethal medical experiments.” 34  According to 
Dower, Japanese racial sentiments resulted in part from American and European 
discriminations toward the Japanese people and in part from the ideology that Japanese 
                                                 
30 Wilson, “The Discourse of National Greatness in Japan,” 37. 
31 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1986), xi. 
32 Dower, War Without Mercy, 24–25. 
33 Ibid., 36. 
34 Ibid., 42. 
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people were superior to Westerners and to other Asians.35 Feelings of superiority bled into 
Japanese media and propaganda that influenced national unity and patriotism. 
Sources say religious nationalism was very important in Japan’s aggressive 
behavioral stance throughout the world because it is an inherent aspect of Japanese culture. 
D.C. Holtom states that the “highest form of the community life is the merging of personal 
destiny in the greater destiny of the nation and that this great personal dedication is fostered 
by what is neither more nor less than a vital religious belief.”36 In Modern Japan and 
Shinto Nationalism, Holtom thoroughly discusses the relationship between Japan’s 
religious foundation and state, giving it the term “State Shinto.” He declares that the 
modern Japanese state was “deliberately established on a foundation which unified 
government and religion.” 37  In Shinto orthodoxy, important affairs of state, such as 
declarations of war, are presented to the deities at large shrines. 38  H. Byron Earhart 
validates Holtom’s declaration, arguing that the emperor himself was revered by the people 
as a “descendant of the Sun Goddess” and was the “sacred leader of the Japanese 
islands,”39 whose divinity is traced back through blood connections with the great kami 
(gods) ancestors.40 Holtom then draws on the close ties the Japanese military has with State 
Shinto and how religion influences Japan’s nationalism and foreign policy. Japanese 
people were taught undivided loyalty to the state. Take, for example, a statement made by 
one cabinet official: 
The protection and advancement of the country are in the care of the 
ancestral spirits and their power resides in the Emperor. The use of that 
power is the work of the Imperial Throne…The central idea of the Japanese 
state is the belief that the spirits of the Imperial ancestors continue to rule 
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through their living representatives, and from this belief springs the singular 
national spirit of the Japanese people.41 
Accordingly, the Japanese believed the decisions made by their state leaders were guided 
directly by their ancestors who would not lead them or their nation astray. 
Japan’s economic growth through imperial expansionism on the Asian mainland 
contributed, furthermore, to increased Japanese nationalism. Louise Young takes a more 
isolated look at the relationship between Japanese nationalism and the making of its colony 
of Manchukuo. Specifically, Young analyzes the effects of mass media and mass-culture 
industries in the development of the Manchurian colony and its economy. Mass-culture 
industries drove the spread of war fever in the 1930s, which in turn stimulated military 
imperialism. 42 The Manchurian Incident stimulated growth and sales for booksellers, 
movie theaters, magazines, and newspaper publishers. Themes of battle heroism, glory of 
sacrifice, and the crisis in the empire circulated throughout the media,43 contributing to a 
sense of national unity and patriotism throughout Japan. Young then explores the 
transformation of Japan’s polity where “imperial interest groups emerged to promote 
military expansion on the Asian mainland.”44 For many of these groups, and especially for 
the educated elite, Manchukuo was an opportunity to build a utopian community, one that 
provided better social justice and greater job prospects than could be found on the island. 
In addition, urban women and union members used “appeals to imperial patriotism to forge 
group solidarity and to press for improved social conditions for themselves.” 45  The 
emergence of these groups would greatly influence agricultural settlement and economic 
development projects throughout Manchukuo.46 
Mainland expansion attracted new business, indicating a drastic change in Japan’s 
economic imperialism. For example, in less than a decade (1931-1940) the number of 
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Japanese manufacturing companies operating outside the Kwantung Leased Territory 
increased from 403 to 1,853 firms.47 This significant increase demonstrated Japan’s new 
capability to expand beyond its traditional port trading and extract resources through 
dominant internal commerce and manufacturing.48 Finally, Young examines emerging 
governmental institutions in Manchukuo that would strengthen and facilitate imperial 
expansion. 
3. Chinese Nationalism 
Turning to Chinese nationalism, scholars also see the importance of ideology. Chen 
Jian, in his book Mao’s China and the Cold War, observes the central role ideology played 
during the Cold War as communism and capitalism clashed in shaping the young, modern 
nation-state. Chen contends that ideology was not given due credit as an “essential agent 
in determining the basic orientation of [the] nation’s foreign policy”49 by a majority of 
political scientists and diplomatic historians. Indeed, Mao’s central theme to foreign policy 
and national security during the Cold War was his drive to overcome imperial humiliation 
and return China to great power status. Building on Jian’s research of ideology as a factor 
influencing Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War era, we may be better able to 
recognize trends used today that continue to shape Chinese foreign policy. 
From a cultural perspective, Zheng Wang argues in his book, Never Forget 
National Humiliation, the importance of understanding Chinese historical memory in order 
to better understand Beijing’s foreign policy behavior. He disagrees with scholars who 
believe China’s rise can be understood by military or economic growth. Conversely, he 
argues that thorough examination of what is taught in a country’s history textbooks, both 
in primary and in secondary schools, informs us of how the state uses these institutions and 
media to guide its citizen’s collective consciousness, contributing to patriotism and 
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national identity. History education stimulates national unity and nationalism.50 Since 
China’s patriotic education campaign was implemented in 1991, greater emphasis by the 
central government has been placed on teaching about national humiliation in order to 
solidify national unity, reminding Chinese people “who they are and how the world 
works.”51 As Wang puts it, “Who we think we are defines what we think we want.”52 
Wang’s personal experience as a native Chinaman, provides first-hand insight on Chinese 
historical memory and how it helps explain the “rapid conversion of China’s popular social 
movements—from the internal-oriented, anti-corruption, and anti[-]dictatorship 
democratic movements of the 1980s to the external-oriented, anti-Western nationalism of 
the 1990s and 2000s.” 53  Understanding how Chinese people self-identify can help 
“determine [Chinese] interests, which in turn determine[s] policy and state action.”54 
Similar to Wang, Yinan He looks at the effects collective memory and state 
historical propaganda have on contemporary Chinese nationalism and how regional 
security may be impacted, especially with growing anti-Japanese sentiments. She argues 
that nationalist sentiments are deeply rooted in “decades of centralized school education 
and official propaganda in China”55 which have embedded injurious misconceptions in 
Chinese national collective memory. Chinese nationalists presume Japan maintains a 
bellicose attitude toward China by refusing to make concessions because Japan wants to 
take advantage of China’s economic interests.56 Chinese nationalists also believe Japan 
has territorial or other strategic ambitions against China.”57 As Chinese hegemony appears 
to be replacing U.S. hegemony in the region, China’s leaders will need to put forth a more 
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concerted effort in restraining nationalist sentiments if they want to maintain regional 
stability and pacific relations with key economic partners such as Japan. Before Chinese 
history textbooks changed in the mid-1980s to reflect a more victimized China, 
normalization with Japan was important for Chinese economic and political interests. War 
atrocities caused by Japan were seen as less important at the time and therefore not depicted 
in great detail. However, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideological foundation for 
regime legitimacy gradually shifted from communism to patriotism.58 Today, resentment 
toward Japan caused by popular nationalism in China increasingly challenges Sino-
Japanese relations over three primary bilateral disputes the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
Taiwan, and maritime resource competition.59 
Scholars also consider the importance of media in diffusing nationalism. In China: 
Fragile Superpower, Susan Shirk explores how Chinese foreign policy, as well as domestic 
politics, have transformed as a result of “newly commercialized media and the internet.”60 
The Propaganda Department within the CCP is the lead organization responsible for 
political content released though the various media outlets. However, with easier access to 
the internet, social media, and global news, the state is faced with a growing challenge of 
mediating nationalism and extreme nationalist ideas which may place the CCP in a hard 
spot. When it comes to foreign policy, nationalists may exploit more readily accessible 
media resources in order to pressure Party leaders to take a harder stand for core national 
interests than what the Party is willing to take. Shirk points out that Party leadership 
recognizes it is in a responsive mode because it can “no longer control the spread of 
information.”61 For a government that has sought diligently to micromanage information 
flow to and from its people, this potentially poses a significant problem for regional 
stability and the rising hegemon. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis explores two hypotheses that may offer explanations as to whether 
Japan’s military, economy, and culture were the main drivers of Japanese nationalism 
before 1945 and whether these same factors are driving Chinese nationalism today. 
(1) Hypothesis #1: Before 1945, Japan’s state religion and militarized ethnic 
nationalism drove its foreign policy as it expanded its physical territory and 
attempted to establish regional hegemony. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Japan’s military engagements with both China 
and Russia were critical turning points in consolidating and defining Japanese nationalism. 
Japan’s strong military boosted its economy, emboldened its leaders to expand the empire’s 
territory, and secured its position as regional hegemon. Meanwhile, Western racism toward 
Japanese culture and ethnicity strained foreign relations with the United States, and, 
therefore, increased Japanese nationalism. As the century continued, Japan’s military 
further solidified Japanese national identity while acting as a member of the allied forces 
against Germany throughout the First World War.  
One key part of Japan’s nationalism was fostering a false sense of identity. Japan 
underwent an enormous struggle with members of the LoN and in negotiating treaty terms 
at the Washington Conference. Japan aspired to be a regional power that could cooperate 
with other leading powers without confrontation. However, racism from Western powers 
fueled a greater racial identity and sense of national unity among the Japanese people. Also, 
State Shinto, as the formally decreed national faith by the Emperor of Japan, appeared to 
have had some nationalist influence, even crossing over into the educational and media 
domains following the Meiji period. These sub-factors sustained Japan’s military power 
and nationalism for half a century. By examining Japan’s military influence as a driving 
factor of nationalism, we can assess whether China’s robust military is following in the 
same footsteps as Japan’s did. 
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(2) Hypothesis #2: Economic success and international integration has had 
greater influence on Chinese national unity and growth as a regional 
hegemon than either military or ethnic drivers have.  
China has undergone a prosperous economic transformation, yielding extraordinary 
growth for the past two decades. China’s economic growth fuels national unity and paves 
the way for the state to emerge as the regional hegemon. It is possible that China’s 
economic growth has endowed it with the means to build-up, strengthen, and modernize 
its military; however, unlike Japan, it is more likely that China’s economic growth drives 
national unity and national pride. If economics is the primary factor driving Chinese 
nationalism, then China will likely integrate with and pursue positions of authority and 
influence within regional institutions, such as APEC and ASEAN. Additionally, China’s 
push to promote regional economic prosperity through the OBOR initiative and establish 
financial institutions to support developmental projects is a way to obtain regional 
economic hegemony, which furthers national unity. 
Contrary evidence to this hypothesis would be that perceptions of racism from 
Western powers fuel nationalism in China. For example, historically, China confronted 
discrimination when it outlawed English opium trade and that, in turn, contributed to the 
Chinese uniting to prevent further harm from outside influences. Similarly, today, China 
may perceive racism by candid Western opposition to the OBOR initiative. To counter-
balance China’s integration into several regional institutions, to maintain already close ties 
with Asian states, and to assure continual access to national interests within the region, the 
United States may petition acceptance as a member of these same economic institutions. 
Doing so could cost China the regional economic advantage it seeks and may provoke 
China to fuel nationalism through the military instead. If the West continues to oppose 
OBOR, framing it as a ruse the CCP is using to consolidate power, then this may, in fact, 
unify Chinese support for OBOR. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Using historical methods and a comparative case study approach, this thesis 
compares the drivers influencing Japanese nationalism before 1945 with the drivers 
influencing Chinese nationalism today. How Japan and China interacted with international 
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institutions revealed the different roles played by military, economy, and culture in driving 
nationalism. Comparison between these two nations can increase understanding of how 
economic, ethnic, and military factors might influence Chinese foreign policy toward the 
United States and what impact nationalism has on East Asia as China rises to regional 
hegemon. 
This thesis uses an assortment of secondary sources such as books, scholarly 
journals, and news articles to compare the cases. The author researched three primary 
factors contributing to Japanese and Chinese nationalism—economics, military, and 
ethnicity—using a pool of literature from books, scholarly journals, think tank reports, and 
news reports. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is divided into four chapters using the comparative case study format to 
systematically examine similarities existing as drivers of nationalism that have influenced 
Japanese and Chinese foreign policy. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II 
compares Japan’s military-driven rise before 1945 to China’s economy-driven rise today 
by analyzing each country’s relationship to international institutions. Chapter III examines 
how the Japanese saw themselves and what role Japanese ethnicity and military played in 
determining Japan’s approach to nation-building in the early twentieth century. It then 
examines how great powers, such as the United States, and Japan’s Korean colony 
responded to Japan’s approach to nation-building. Subsequently, Chapter III discusses 
China’s understanding of OBOR. Chapter IV concludes the research and outlines how this 
thesis’s findings can better inform U.S. policymakers toward East Asia, generally, and, 
specifically, toward China today. 
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II. JAPANESE AND CHINESE APPROACHES TO 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Chapter I introduced the question of what drove Japan’s pre-WWII nationalism and 
what is driving China’s current nationalism. This chapter compares Japan’s military-driven 
rise to China’s economy-driven rise by analyzing each country’s relationship to 
international institutions. It begins by examining Japan prior to World War II. It shows that 
Meiji Japan, imitating Western powers in an attempt to gain recognition as an equal, 
established a government patterned after Western states. Japan’s leaders borrowed the idea 
of having a constitutionally run government, and foreign affairs would structure Japan’s 
domestic politics.62 Japan’s leaders also perceived that, in order to become a great nation, 
Japan must industrialize more fully and expand its empire throughout the Asia-Pacific 
region. They did so by “craft[ing] their expansionist policies along Western lines, 
deploy[ing] the same gunboat tactics to establish domination in Korea, and appeal[ing] to 
the same legal justification to legitimate it.”63 Prior to Japan turning entirely to its military 
as a means of building national unity and international influence, Japan had joined 
international institutions, such as the League of Nations (LoN), and participated in the 
Washington Conference in order to establish recognized parity among great powers. Try 
as it might to achieve parity among Western powers, however, Japan’s sword could not 
slice through the thick and persistent racism. After leaving the LoN, Japan promoted 
national unity through its rising military, a situation that continued through World War II. 
The second section of the chapter examines China’s current rise. Unlike pre-WWII 
Japan, China is currently succeeding at expanding through international institutions and 
unifying its people via the economy rather than the military. Whereas Japan attempted to 
reach out to Western nations and was not recognized as an equal global power, China has 
sought recognition as a global power from other Asian nations and succeeded. China’s 
successful recognition by neighboring states as a modern, great power—and China’s 
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involvement in several multilateral regional institutions has positioned it to launch its 
largest effort at international influence, the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. OBOR, 
a strategic approach by China to build roads, ports, rails, economic corridors, and other 
infrastructure development projects throughout Asia, Africa, and Eurasia, will attempt to 
connect China with the rest of the world, to integrate international economies more easily, 
and to place China at the apex of the global hegemonic order. 
A. JAPAN’S RISE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The Meiji Restoration of 1868 clearly marked a turning point for a modernizing 
Japan. Following the downfall of two centuries of Tokugawa rule over feudal Japan, 
Japanese leaders changed the state bureaucracy, formed a unified military institution, and 
established a national defense policy to mimic, to a certain degree, powerful Western 
nations. For the next two decades, Meiji leaders sought guidance from Western nations and 
carefully constructed Japan’s first constitution, modeled in part after Western nations. 
Implementing a constitution and establishing a parliamentary institution made the imperial 
institution a “symbol of national identity and the Diet a means for achieving national 
unity.”64 Japan’s transition from a feudal state to a modern state would see the government 
“united in a conception of national unity and defense” at both the empire’s center and 
periphery.65 The Imperial House would be the chief cornerstone to Japan’s constitution, 
and, unlike that of Western constitutions, the first principle of the constitution would be 
“respect for the sovereign rights of the Emperor.”66 Significantly, the constitution having 
Emperor’s Rights as a principle set the precedent for how Japan’s modern military, the 
people as a whole, and future colonies revered the Emperor as the central unifying factor 
of nation and empire. 
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Western influence greatly shaped Japan’s early transition to a modern state, 
including its constitutional document, the Charter Oath. As Japan modernized, the Charter 
Oath outlined the primary rules for Japanese citizens to abide by, five clearly written 
articles67 that symbolized the beginning of an era whereby Japan would “turn to the 
West”68 in order to strengthen their nation. Japan would not be viewed as an inferior 
people, but rather as an equal among the great Western states. Over the course of the next 
two decades (1870s–1880s), Japan opened its doors to foreign teachers and sent thousands 
of students abroad to learn from foreign institutions and Western nations. The knowledge 
obtained from foreign institutions and brought back to the homeland would profoundly 
affect Japanese national policy and Japan’s eventual approach to national unity through 
strengthening the military. 
Japan worked on its military for the entire latter half of the nineteenth century, 
imitating Western nations’ military might. Japan did not have a national military until after 
the Meiji restoration. In fact, it was not until 1873 that the army organized from the former 
Samurai (warrior) class of Daimyo lord loyalists to a national conscript force—as was 
common at the time among great powers like Russia, Britain, Germany, and France.69 
Men, after they turned twenty, had to serve three years of active duty followed by an 
additional four years in the reserve.70 The Japanese government employed French and 
German military officials to train young military commanders and soldiers. By 1894, Japan 
boasted a modernized fighting army of 73,000 men during peacetime operations and 
another 200,000 men for wartime operations,71 capable of mobilizing beyond the main 
islands. The navy was a far more delicate matter. Quality, modern ships needed to be 
purchased abroad, navy officers and seaman required “long and technical training,” and 
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“maritime defense was a less vital issue” for Japanese leaders at the time.72 Meager as it 
was compared to Western navies, Japan owned a fleet comprising 24 torpedo boats and 28 
modern ships.73 However, by the end of the nineteenth century, after proving itself a nation 
militarily capable of mobilizing, fighting and defeating a stronger, more seasoned force, 
“military service came to be accepted as the patriotic obligation of Japanese men by most 
recruits and their families.” 74  The growing popularity of Japan’s military laid the 
foundation for leaders to confidently and legitimately extend their sphere of influence 
through imperialism. 
Despite commendable military might and also moves toward imperialism, the 
Western nations did not really recognize Japan as an equal. Imperialism was commonplace 
among modern states during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. France, 
Britain, the United States, Germany, and Russia all extended national spheres of influence 
throughout Asia. Japan perceived imperialism as an integral part of joining the family of 
nations, expanding into the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and northern China. The successful 
defeat of the once great Chinese in the Sino–Japanese War increased Japan’s military 
prestige and standing among great power nations. Fully aware of Japan’s rising influence 
throughout the East Asian region, Britain agreed to sign an Anglo–Japanese alliance in 
1902, requiring each to support the other by safeguarding their interests in both Korea and 
China.75 The alliance significantly moved Japan one step closer toward officially being 
recognized as an equal among great powers. Japan further shocked the world when, as the 
military underdog, it defeated the Russian military in the Russo–Japanese war of 1904–
1905. However, despite Japan’s global engagement and military might, it seemed that the 
nations Japan aspired to impress the most (especially the United States) barely 
acknowledged it as a growing power worthy of recognition. For example, Japanese 
immigrants to the United States, particularly California, were seen to be “the spearhead of 
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an expanding nation, a bridge between [Japan and the United States]…Americans rejected 
such expansionism and began talking of war on racial grounds.”76 Western powers’ further 
deplorable treatment of Japan continued throughout Japan’s time as a member of the LoN 
and in its participation in the Washington Conference. 
1. Japan’s Relationship with the League of Nations 
Attempting to address racial inequality while joining the worldstage, Japan’s 
entrance to and exit from the LoN proved bittersweet. Like the other great powers 
represented at the creation of the LoN, Japan had an agenda. A primary stated theme for 
the great powers was to construct an institution comprised of nations that would ensure 
“peace and justice throughout the world.” 77 However, Japan came to the table more 
concerned with addressing and achieving three primary objectives: gaining racial equality, 
recovering the Pacific islands formerly occupied by Germany, and establishing economic 
rights over Shandong Province.78 Japanese delegates repeatedly requested to have a clause 
regarding racial equality admitted as part of the League Covenant. However, Japan’s 
delegation failed to achieve their objective regarding race equality—perhaps the most 
important objective because it signified “one of the motivating goals behind the political, 
social, and industrial changes of the Meiji period.”79 Japan did achieve minimal foreign 
recognition as a great power during the peace conference, a feat that had been lacking since 
Japan defeated the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War, though it was not yet considered 
an equal power. After months of deliberation during the armistice negotiations following 
World War I, Japan joined the League on 10 January 1920. Some Japanese leaders and 
journalists were unsatisfied with the outcome and Japan’s relationship with other members 
of the LoN: 
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It is highly doubtful that this anomalous relationship between the Orient and 
the Occident will be appreciably altered by the organization of the League 
of Nations which refuses to accept the obviously just principle that no race 
in the League shall be discriminated against in any of the countries bound 
by its covenant. As far as Asia is concerned, the League is not likely to be 
the harbinger of glad tidings.80 
Despite continual and concerted effort to address race equality, Japan remained a 
strong advocate for and a member of the LoN until it left the institution in 1933. 
2. Japan and the Washington Conference 
Prior to Japan leaving the LoN, tensions between Japan and international 
institutions emerged and were resolved only by signing multiple treaties at the Washington 
Conference of 1921–1922, starting with the Four-Power Treaty. The Four-Power Treaty 
resolved to mitigate political and military concerns not fully closed at the signing of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Japan, the United States, France, and Britain agreed to mutually 
respect each other’s rights and territorial possessions in East Asia, particularly in China, 
and, should crisis of any sort occur in the region, to consult each other prior to taking any 
retaliatory actions.81 Effectively terminating the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 set to 
expire in 1923, the Four-Power Treaty prevented signatory powers from entering into 
agreements with each other or other powers. The treaty was seen as a diplomatic success 
for the United States because, where the Americans saw Japan’s rising military as a 
potential threat to U.S. colonial possessions in Asia, the Japanese could have used the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty to force the British to fight Americans—though this was highly 
unlikely—in the event America should go to war with Japan.82 
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Next, the Nine-Power Treaty 83  addressed tensions concerning China’s 
independence and territorial integrity. This multilateral treaty marked the 
“internationalization of the U.S. Open Door Policy in China.”84 Japan’s footprint on the 
Korean peninsula and occupation of Manchuria would remain in effect while the 
sovereignty of Shandong would be given back to China.85 The Nine-Power Treaty was 
designed to allow China the opportunity to re-establish a stable government without 
interference by, unequal influence from, or unequal trade opportunities for contracting 
powers. In addition to the Four-Power Treaty signatories above, Portugal, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and China also deliberated and signed the Nine-Power Treaty.86 
Finally, the Five-Power Treaty aimed to resolve another major source of tension, 
Western attempts to restrict the growth of the Japanese Navy. The Five-Power Treaty, 
signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, Italy, and France, highlighted the most 
important reason for convening the Washington Conference talks. It outlined an agreement 
whereby each signatory would limit its capital ship tonnage and, therefore, limit their 
capacity to attack each other. Initially, Japan was hesitant to sign such an agreement 
because it would significantly limit its expanding military and empire aspirations. 
However, in exchange for Japan’s agreement to the proposed naval tonnage limit, Western 
powers would be prohibited from building naval bases in the Philippines and Hong Kong 
and from fortifying Pacific islands,87 giving Japan a better sense of security in their own 
sphere of influence. The Five Power Treaty, also known as the Washington Naval Treaty 
stopped rumors about Japan and America going to war.88 
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Some leaders, however, felt the treaty was unfair, and peace was short-lived. Japan 
withdrew from the LoN in 1933, and, by the end of 1939, Japan ranked second in producing 
the world’s amount of gross tonnage in shipbuilding.89 Despite signing the treaties at the 
Washington Conference, many Japanese leaders “regarded them as designed to contain 
Japan’s security goals.”90 Katō Kanji, chief aide to Japan’s Naval Minister present at the 
Washington Conference, viewed the naval treaty as “another humiliating unequal treaty” 
and went so far as to declare, “As far as I am concerned, war with America starts now. 
We’ll take revenge on her. We will!” 91  Moreover, following the conclusion of the 
conference, Japan never received full recognition as an equal great power among powerful 
nations. However, the naval limitation arrangements agreed upon per the treaties legally 
ceded “military supremacy in the northwestern Pacific” to Japan.92 
Another major factor that led to Japan’s withdrawal from the LoN was the 
Manchurian Incident. In 1931, the Japanese Guandong Army, responding to an explosion 
on the South Manchurian Railway supposedly caused by the Chinese, but most likely set 
off by the Guandong Army, fought Chinese troops in Manchuria.93 The Guandong Army 
then proceeded to invade northern China, contrary to orders from the General Staff in 
Tokyo. The League sent a commission of inquiry headed by British Lord Victor Bulwer-
Lytton to investigate the incident surrounding the alleged explosion on the South 
Manchurian Railway.94 In the meantime, the Guandong Army created the “independent 
state of Manchukuo.”95 The League Secretariat, Council, and Assembly, three separate 
bodies within the League itself composed of both diplomats and impartial laypersons 
reviewed the Lytton report.96 Despite many favorable findings for Japan by the Lytton 
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investigation, a Committee of Nineteen convened. The committee came to similar 
conclusions as the Lytton Report yet determined the “military operations of Japanese 
troops” in self-defense to be illegitimate.97 The verdict caused Matsuoka Yōsuka, the 
Japanese emissary at the Assembly, to declare the unforgettable words, 
The Japanese Government now finds itself compelled to conclude that 
Japan and the other Members of the League entertain different views on the 
manner of achieving peace in the Far East, and the Japanese Government is 
obliged to feel that it has now reached the limit of its endeavors to cooperate 
with the League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese differences.98 
Japan officially withdrew from the institutions that it viewed as perhaps its best 
opportunity to be on apparent equal footing with the great powers of the West.99 Then, it 
instead focused on expanding its sphere of influence through territorial expansion into 
China and the islands of Southeast Asia while also promoting nationalism by building up 
its military might once again. 
B. CHINA’S APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
This section first examines a few primary international institutions within which 
China is currently involved. Then, it details OBOR in order to establish a foundation for 
how institutions encourage or discourage Chinese national unity. Arguably, Japan’s 
economic and institutional failures in the early twentieth century may have served as a 
guide from which China has learned not to repeat at the expense of unifying the nation. 
China has taken a very different approach to the international order than pre-World War II 
Japan. China has moved toward a more cooperative relations policy with international 
institutions, exerting greater economic development, national security influence in East 
Asia, and financial stability, paving the way forward for the OBOR initiative.  
China’s approach to regional economic and security cooperation has gradually 
shifted since the mid-1990s. Before this shift, Beijing preferred cooperation through 
bilateral leader engagements, agreements, and cultural exchanges. Today, China has 
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undertaken a more concerted effort to become a member of many multilateral regional 
institutions such as ASEAN + 1 and ASEAN + 3, APEC, Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), Six-Party Talks, and the ARF, 100  seeking to portray a more 
regionally aligned, cooperative, and mutually beneficial nation. More recently, President 
and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping announced China would embark on the OBOR 
initiative, marking a drastic leap forward in international Chinese foreign policy. For a long 
time, China viewed multilateralism as a threat to its state sovereignty. Now, China seems 
to be embracing multilateralism and institution-building with open arms, indicating a 
willingness to work inclusively and in a variety of multinational forums. What were 
China’s relationships to the institutions previously mentioned before the announcement of 
the OBOR initiative? What exactly is the OBOR initiative, and what institutions is China 
establishing to augment and accomplish its proposed plan? China’s membership to 
multiple regional institutions serves as a means to discuss and coordinate political, security, 
and economic issues. 
1. International Institutions Emphasizing Economic Cooperation 
China has come to recognize the value of economic cooperation with states on its 
periphery. The most effective way for China to engage with its neighbors without 
appearing to be a threat to them is by participating in institutions that bring many nations 
together for the purpose of economic improvement. ASEAN and APEC are only two 
among many such institutions that China has eagerly joined. When China is accepted into 
these institutional dialogues, China is allowed to have a voice in how its neighbors interact 
in regional economic affairs. Without a doubt, China’s geographic and population size 
provide incredible leverage and influence over its neighbors and the decisions each state 
makes individually concerning its economic interests. 
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a. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) + 1 and ASEAN + 3 
Participation in ASEAN and resulting strengthening relationships have been key 
for both China’s economic foreign policy drive and to gain regional hegemony. ASEAN 
officially formed August 8, 1967, and comprised of five nations, including Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Since then, ASEAN has expanded to 
include Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. The primary objective for 
establishing an institution comprised of Southeast Asian nations was to “establish 
economic cooperation, politics, social and culture” and to protect mutual interests by 
“creating regional solidarity as well as promoting regional peace and stability.”101 When 
Deng Xiaoping instituted an economic reformation in the 1980s, China opened its doors to 
Southeast Asian nations, encouraging them to invest in China and establish bilateral 
economic growth. Since then, China has taken the opportunity to utilize ASEAN + 1 and 
ASEAN + 3 (Japan, China, and South Korea) forums to discuss tensions between China 
and ASEAN members concerning fishing, sea-lanes, maritime resources, and trans-border 
crimes in the southeast maritime frontiers, fighting “terrorism, cross-border crimes, and 
transnational disease” in the southwest frontiers, 102  and promoting mutual economic 
growth. 
b. Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
China has explicitly built regional unity through economically-focused APEC. 
APEC is a trans-regional, trans-Pacific economic institution with members in both North 
and South America as well as Asia. Its primary purpose is to facilitate trade and economic 
integration, but it is often perceived as “little more than a talking-shop.”103 At the 2014 
APEC forum meeting held in Beijing, President Xi Jinping boldly declared to an audience 
of more than 1500 business people that “the development prospect of [the Asia-Pacific] 
region hinges on the decisions and actions we take today. We are duty-bound to create and 
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fulfill an Asia-Pacific dream for our people.” 104  In the same meeting, Xi Jinping 
encouraged redoubling efforts to “forge a partnership of mutual trust, inclusiveness and 
win-win cooperation and jointly build an open economy.”105 While APEC remains an 
institution meant to discuss primarily topics of economic importance, China did not hesitate 
to include rhetoric surrounding security concerns even though there exist many forums 
specifically for that purpose. 
2. International Institutions Emphasizing Security Cooperation 
a. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
In the last twenty years, China has increased its presence with the SCO, which has 
helped China drive economic development while ensuring security against terrorism. In 
1996, Beijing set up the Shanghai Five Forum as a regional security association, comprised 
of “China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.”106 Five years later, it was 
renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and added Uzbekistan as a member.107 
The purpose of the SCO is primarily security focused through which chartered members 
“combat the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, but,” Miller 
adds, “China also views it as a vehicle for economic cooperation.”108 Ethnic nationalism, 
which the Chinese government labels as separatism and as the “most crucially important 
issue involving [the] nation’s fate, development, and stability,”109 has also been a central 
unifying theme for China and the other members of the SCO. As of 2015, the SCO 
expanded its membership to include both Pakistan and India.110 The SCO has also served 
as a forum for China to discuss resource management, environmental issues, and ongoing 
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instability of the Korean peninsula in the northeast frontier.111 Unlike prewar Japan, by 
building relationships with neighboring nations, China is successfully increasing both 
economics and security, thereby bringing their country closer together. 
b. Six-Party Talks 
China uses international institutions to address security concerns against not only 
non-state actor threats, but also state actors influencing regional affairs. China’s continued 
participation in the Six-Party Talks increases its regional influence. In August 2003, China 
hosted the first Six-Party Talks, comprised of China, Japan, Russia, the United States, 
North Korea, and South Korea. The institution was established to address the “second 
North Korean nuclear crisis” when North Korean First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Kang Sok-Ju admitted to U.S. officials that they had a “highly enriched uranium 
programme,” which violated the 1994 Agreed Framework pact signed by both Pyongyang 
and Washington.112 China’s initial participation and mediation in the institution reflected 
that of an observer rather than active participant. However, since the Six-Party Talks in 
2005, China has participated more actively, using the forum as an opportunity for its 
leaders to “shape a new security architecture in East Asia,” thus partially satisfying their 
security-related goals.113 Today, both Beijing and Washington view this institution as the 
“best venue to deal with North Korea’s behavior.”114 Furthermore, the Six-Party Talks, as 
a security institution for Northeast Asia, has served as a forum to greatly improve relations 
between Japan, China, and South Korea. Maintaining a stable security environment is a 
primary step in permitting China the ability to focus on economic growth that OBOR is 
expected to achieve, and providing Chinese citizens with rising standards of living. 
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c. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
In addition to the Six-Party Talks, China also participates in the ARF to address 
regional security, which is a larger forum comprised of ten additional countries. From a 
realist perspective, ASEAN established the ARF in 1994 in order to “create the conditions 
for a stable balance of power.”115 However, constructivists view the ARF from a norm-
oriented framework whereby “participants seek regional peace and cooperation.116 The 
ARF provides an avenue for regional states to “pursue a security dialogue without 
assuming any friend-enemy relation”117 and remains a forum for “an informal approach 
toward regional security consultation for its member states to exchange information 
through dialogue, build confidence, signal concerns, and issue public statements of 
agreement on their lowest common objectives.”118 China’s participation in this second 
regional security forum demonstrates its intent to truly seek cooperative relationships in 
the region so as to deter security threats in order to pursue greater economic growth 
opportunities. 
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3. One Belt, One Road Initiative 
The plan for OBOR mirrors the old Silk Road (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  One Belt, One Road119 
China’s concerted efforts to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate through multiple 
multi-national institutions prepared the way for the announcement of the OBOR initiative 
with minimum pushback or objection from regional Asian states. The OBOR initiative 
emphasizes a strategic transformation in China’s economic development model, forcing 
China to work closely with other countries, particularly those along its periphery, and 
“forge a ‘community of shared destiny’ in Asia.” 120  Speaking at the February 2010 
Munich Security Conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated: 
A more developed China will undertake more international responsibilities 
and will never pursue self interests at the expense of the interests of others. 
We know full well that in this interdependent world, China’s future is 
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closely linked to that of the world. Our own interests and those of others are 
best served when we work together to expand common interests, share 
responsibilities and seek win-win outcomes. That is why while focusing on 
its own development, China is undertaking more and more international 
responsibilities commensurate with its strength and status.121 
Since Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ascension to the highest political position within the 
CCP, China’s foreign policy approach shifted from former President Deng Xiaoping’s 
“maintain a ‘low profile’ abroad” strategy to Xi’s new “going out” strategy.122 
The OBOR initiative was first highlighted as two separate projects. In September 
and October of 2013, while visiting Central and Southeast Asia, President Xi announced 
China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” initiatives as 
propositions to promote joint economic prosperity and regional economic cooperation, to 
“strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations,” and to 
“promote world peace and development.”123 Collectively, the “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
and the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” have been interchangeably referred to as the 
OBOR initiative as well as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As China’s plans for the 
twin projects developed, Beijing opted to simplify, labeling them under a single moniker, 
“One Belt, One Road” (yidai yilu).124 
The “Silk Road Economic Belt” is comparable to the historic Silk Road trade routes 
that linked together Asia, Europe, and Africa more than two millennia ago. It aims to 
establish a series of three new land-based transport infrastructures and industrial corridors 
that span Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East: the China-Central Asia-West Asia, 
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China-Mongolia-Russia, and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors.125 While the 
“Silk Road Economic Belt” is expected to connect China with the nations of Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and potentially Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, and 
Syria, China claims the OBOR initiative will eventually bridge at least sixty-seven 
nations.126 
The “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” concentrates on establishing two economic 
trade corridors by sea, the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” and the “Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor.” 127  In a speech given to the Indonesian 
Parliament on October 2, 2013, Xi Jinping announced his desire to strengthen China-
ASEAN cooperation through a joint effort of building the “Maritime Silk Road of the 21st 
century…for the benefit of common development and prosperity.”128 If China succeeds in 
connecting these nations, then the world could expect to see another Sino-centric pan-Asia 
region similar to what existed centuries ago. At the very least, OBOR should strengthen 
Chinese national unity as these trade routes encourage cultural exchanges, economic 
business, and strengthen Chinese soft power. 
The greater purpose that Beijing put forth was for all nations involved with the 
OBOR initiative to “move toward the objectives of mutual benefit and common 
security.”129 In addition to goals of mutual benefit and common security, China claims 
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OBOR is designed to improve equality, inclusivity, mutual learning, and cooperation.130 
In anticipation of the many complexities and requirements necessary to achieve the OBOR 
initiative, China has engaged international institutions more frequently and initiated the 
organization of additional institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) New Development 
Bank (NDB). 
4. Financial Institutions Supporting OBOR 
a. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
Two primary banks support OBOR: the AIIB and BRICS NDB. AIIB provides 
China with an additional avenue for international cooperation and influence. In October 
2014, representatives from twenty-one nations signed a memorandum of understanding, 
officially creating the AIIB with Beijing being the natural choice to headquarter the 
financial institution.131 The intent behind creating the AIIB is to provide an international 
financial institution that funds development and infrastructure projects across Asia, 
especially those projects aimed at connecting China’s OBOR. Apart from financing 
OBOR, the AIIB is also expected to “benefit developing Asian countries that lack 
infrastructure funds.” 132  According to Xiao, the establishment of AIIB resulted from 
China’s economic foreign policy shift in three areas: “changes in trade and investment 
relations are taking place from previously absorbing foreign direct investment and 
exporting manufactured goods to investing more overseas today,” “China’s private capital 
and domestic industries are being prompted…to ‘go out’ further together,” and “throughout 
the implementation of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, the coastal industries, supported 
by the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, are increasingly shifting to China’s middle and 
western regions and looking for markets in Central Asia and the Middle East.”133 While 
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AIIB is intended to be a mutually beneficial institution, China may benefit more because 
the AIIB could act as a forum for internationalizing the Chinese Renminbi (RMB)134 much 
like the Euro and the U.S. dollar. As the AIIB takes root and grows, it is likely that China’s 
influence will further expand internationally through lending financial support for 
underdeveloped projects outside the scope of OBOR. 
b. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) New Development 
Bank (NDB) 
As an international financial institution (IFI), the BRICS NDB provides China with 
an alternative source to AIIB for financing the many projects for OBOR. The BRICS NDB 
emerged in 2015 as a “commitment towards greater institutionalisation [sic]” and 
“convergence towards shared interest.”135 At the BRICS New Delhi Summit in 2012, 
participating countries were concerned with the lagging response of Western-led IFIs, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, to the Eurozone crisis, a 
faltering global economic recovery, and “mounting concerns about sustainable 
development and climate change.”136 They declared at the Delhi Summit: 
We therefore call for a more representative international financial 
architecture with an increase in the voice and representation of developing 
countries and the establishment and improvement of a just international 
monetary system that can serve the interests of all countries and support the 
development of emerging and developing economies.137 
The NDB was, thereafter, conceived and subsequently established as an 
international banking institution “geared towards responding to a deficient international 
monetary system.”138 China’s association with the BRICS NDB will strengthen its ability 
to reach out and influence other developing countries and emerging economies while at the 
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same time reinforcing multilateral cooperation through infrastructure development. 
Additionally, the establishment of these two IFIs has led to China’s Yuan to officially be 
recognized as an internationally exchanged currency. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to be acknowledged a member of great power nations, early modern 
Japan adapted the Western imperialist model and immediately focused on building a 
modern military. Japan wanted to show Western nations that it, too, was a great power 
because of its territorial expansion and defeat of superior militaries. However, rather than 
receive praise for its accomplishments, Japan was treated with scorn. Integration with the 
LoN and participation in the Washington Conference sparked resentment between Japan 
and Western nations because the latter appeared hypocritical in their actions toward the 
former and tried to contain Japanese imperialism. Integration with international institutions 
failed to strengthen Japanese nationalism. This, in turn, resulted in Japan turning its back 
on international institutions and following ethnic and racial paths to nationalism, bringing 
their people together but internationally isolating. Japan turned to an isolationist approach 
to boost national unity while its growing military served as the chief cornerstone for 
unifying the nation. Thus, they entered WWII with feelings of racial scorn, a strong military 
and untied populace, and a sense of international isolation. 
China’s approach to strengthening national unity, on the other hand, has occurred 
through an entirely different manner than Japan’s. While both China and Japan engaged 
international institutions as a means for building or expanding national identity, Japan 
failed to engage with neighboring nations in a cooperative way as it extended national 
influence throughout Asia. China, however, is well on its way to project greater influence 
not only within the Asia-Pacific region, but also in reaching out as far as the Middle East, 
the Baltic States, and into Africa through its OBOR initiative. Since the 1980s, China has 
progressively married up with multilateral institutions. It has exhibited a greater 
willingness to position itself in relations that are more cooperative and exert greater 
economic development and national security influence in East Asia. China’s influence 
extends beyond economic cooperation as it anticipates providing improved and alternative 
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financial stability for developing countries. Whereas Japan withdrew from international 
institutions and turned to an independent, autarkic development of national unity, 
considering themselves racially superior to all other races, China has continued to draw 
closer to its neighbors through cooperation, positioning themselves as a unifying people 
with a strong military, strong economy, and international cooperation. 
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III. JAPANESE AND CHINESE APPROACHES TO 
NATION-BUILDING 
Chapter II compared Japan’s rise and ties to the military to China’s rise and its ties 
to the economy by analyzing each country’s relationship with international institutions. 
This chapter examines how the Japanese saw themselves and what role Japan’s culture and 
military played in determining Japan’s approach to nation-building in the early twentieth 
century. Drawing from various international responses to Japanese and Chinese national 
policies, this chapter, then, examines how great powers, such as the United States and 
Japan’s colonies, particularly Korea, responded to Japan’s approach to nation-building. 
Subsequently, this chapter discusses China’s understanding of the One Belt, One Road 
(OBOR). Contemporary Chinese nationalism is following the same path as Japan’s 
militaristic expansionist ethno-nationalism, only, instead of a militaristic expansionist path, 
China has chosen path of economic expansionist ethno-nationalism. Apparently, China 
sees OBOR as promoting regional security and economic cooperation, mutual trust, mutual 
tolerance, and stimulating nationalism. Some countries support OBOR because they see 
OBOR as a step in the right direction for promoting regional trade, financial growth, and 
regional economic development. Other countries are less supportive because China’s plans 
for OBOR remain somewhat opaque and because some expected infrastructure routes may 
ignite current tensions where sovereignty and territorial integrity is in dispute. 
A comparative historical analysis of rising hegemons can show whether 
nationalism drives power and foreign policy, and, if so, what results. For example, Japan’s 
ethnic nationalism strengthened from the turn of the twentieth century and throughout the 
following four decades. Japan’s military played a leading role in engendering that 
nationalist identity. Japan’s growing nationalism ultimately led to confrontation with 
Western nations because of racism and ill-understood ethnic differences. Like Sandra 
Wilson, I believe Japan pursued nation-building more aggressively through its military. As 
a relatively new modern state, Japan was following the example of prominent and powerful 
Western states. Because Western powers had acquired territories throughout Asia, Japan 
saw it as perfectly normal to do the same, and, therefore, built up its military. As Japan’s 
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military grew and was checked by two major wars against superior foes, Japan was able to 
unify its people. Japan’s nation-building expanded further as it acquired land on the 
mainland Asia, specifically the Korean peninsula and Manchuria. 
China, on the other hand, has relied less on its military for expanding national-
unity. Instead, China is using soft power to drive its nationalist goals. China’s goals for 
OBOR are far-reaching and include placing greater emphasis on mutual cooperation 
between China and many of its neighboring states, as well as addressing regional and 
national security threats. Regional institutions like ASEAN, and countries, such as Russia 
and Pakistan, have largely praised OBOR and its purpose. At the same time, however, 
countries like Germany, Uzbekistan, and India have shown mixed and even opposing 
reactions. 
A. JAPAN AMONG MODERN NATIONS 
Western nations greatly influenced Japan’s transition to becoming a modern state. 
Perhaps one of the greatest influences the West had on Japan was the change that occurred 
through its governing power and military. However, change is often difficult to cope with 
and for many Japanese it was not accepted. The fall of the old Shogunate order and rise of 
the new Meiji order convinced Daimyō leaders to “voluntarily surrender their lands back 
to the emperor.”139 Surrendering their lands to the emperor abrogated former obeisance of 
the land workers to the Daimyō leaders, dictating from that point forward that all people 
and land had become subject to the emperor’s rule.140 Without the Daimyō leadership 
structure, Japan organized a new national way to preserve and defend its people and culture 
from the threat “posed by the encircling Western powers,” creating a “modern, legal state 
of its own.”141 In other words, fear of Western nation-states motivated Japan to modernize 
in a way that would establish national unity. Kido Takayoshi, an early leader of the Meiji 
Restoration, explains well the need for a modern Japanese state when he declared: 
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There is an urgent need for Japan to become strong enough militarily to take 
a stand against the Western powers. As long as our country is lacking in 
military power, the law of nations is not to be trusted. When dealing with 
those who are weak, the strong nations often invoke public law but really 
calculate their own gain. Thus, it seems to me that the law of nations is 
merely a tool for the conquest of the weak.142 
As can be expected during times of great governmental change, not everyone 
supported the new Meiji constitution. Kita Ikki believed only through violent confrontation 
would Japan be able to cleanse the bureaucratic leadership to rid the nation from “Western 
political institutions and economic practices,” thus enabling the “people’s emperor” to truly 
lead a state of communalism and eradicate the “darkness spread over Asia by the Versailles 
Treaty.”143 Not only would confrontation be required to change domestic politics, but it 
would also be imminent in addressing the foreign threat of Western encroachment in Asia. 
Prophetically, Kita believed it would take a “conclusive naval confrontation” between 
Japan and the West to force the West out of Asia and secure Japan’s sphere of influence.144 
The fact that many Japanese felt enslaved to the “corrosive influence of the West” is 
evidenced by several attempted political assassinations and coups in the early 1930s.145 
Japan’s nationalist expansionism strongly incorporated the country’s militaristic 
education curriculum to align with its foreign policy. During the Russo-Japanese War, for 
example, school subjects such as science, math, ethics, and Japanese language stressed 
patriotism and the war. Classes were required to discuss topics such as “the meaning of the 
imperial edict declaring war, the imperial edict on the course of the war, the exploits of 
valiant Japan and our valiant military men, the special behavior expected of children during 
the war, and the duty of military service,” “the imperial edicts related to war, articles about 
the war situation, letters to and from soldiers at the front,” “calculations about military 
matters,” and “general information about searchlights, wireless communication, land 
mines, and torpedoes, submarines, military dirigibles, Shimose explosives, military carrier 
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pigeons, heavy cannon, mortars, machine guns, the Arisaka cannon, and military 
sanitation.”146 Not only did military matters inundate the classrooms, but also military 
physical training was instituted as part of the core curriculum.147 While these subjects 
implanted intellectually painted masterpieces in the minds of schoolchildren, military 
songs sung by the populace provided an emotional glue that would bind the people together 
when confronted with conflict over the next four decades. 
Japan’s military was central to its nationalism. After leaving the League of Nations 
in the early 1930s, Japan entered a period of international isolation. Politicians turned to 
the military for solving peripheral problems, such as repressing the rising Chinese 
nationalism in Manchuria. Additionally, the Manchurian Incident initiated a “rapid military 
build-up” and led to an imperial “war fever” in which popular culture promoted 
militarization.148 Media and news outlets voluntarily produced material for military and 
government propagandists, thus gaining public support for the military occupation in 
Northeast China.149 Media, combined with racism against Chinese during and after the 
Sino-Japanese War, 150  and the success and sacrifice of men in two significant wars 
spanning a decade aided in unifying the people and placing militarism at the center of 
Japanese nationalism.151 An attitude of Asian superiority prevailed throughout the nation 
and extended out to the colonies. 
Civilian writers like Ikezaki Tadakata reinforced military leaders’ thought and 
expansionist ideology. In 1929, Ikezaki wrote, “It is well known that Japan’s 
overpopulation grows more serious every year. Where should we find an outlet for these 
millions?...[T]he only remaining area is the Asian mainland. Moreover, Japan’s claim to 
the region is written in the blood and treasure of two wars.”152 
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1. Centrality of Ethnicity to National Understanding 
The Japanese traditionally regarded themselves to be a superior race to foreigners. 
From the institution of the Meiji government and constitution through the expanding 
empire of the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese leaders made it a point to incorporate racial 
doctrines of superiority. This ideology is first reflected in Shinto orthodoxy and Japan’s 
leaders “believed that Shinto rituals and symbols could be useful tools for…uniting the 
people with a common creed.”153 The emperor was also believed to be a direct blood 
descendant of Shinto gods. Thus, there existed “an unbroken lineage reaching back to the 
very beginning of the foundation of the [nation].”154 Then, as Japan acquired the colonies 
of Korea and Taiwan, the Japanese “attempted to force racial assimilation [upon the 
natives] through coercive diffusion of Japanese language, Japanese names, and shrine 
Shinto.”155 A classified report consisting of nearly four thousand pages, entitled “An 
Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus,” and produced by the 
Population and Race Section of the Research Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
depicted in great detail the “rationale behind policies that were actually adopted toward 
other races and nationalities.”156 According to the classified report, Japan intended to 
“establish permanent dominance over all other races and peoples in Asia—in accordance 
with their needs, and as befitted their destiny as a superior race.”157 Ethnic and racial 
superiority, therefore, initially drove modern Japan’s approach to nation-building and 
national unity. It was the military and militarism, however, which enforced the policy that 
would strengthen Japanese unity and nationalism among the people. 
Coinciding with Japanese militarism and expansionism, the Japanese government 
propagated the importance of colonizing. In an effort to promote racial expansionism, the 
emigration movement “became the latest imperative in an already multifaceted colonial 
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mission that embraced Taiwan, Korea, the Pacific Islands, and China.”158 Ministers of 
colonization inspired the Japanese people to “Go! Go and colonize the continent! For the 
development of the Yamato race, to build the new order in Asia!”159 Hence, there was no 
shame emigrating to the colonies in the name of patriotism. Instead, those who did so would 
be viewed as “soldiers of the hoe” destined to seed the empire with the racial spirit of the 
Yamato people.”160 
2. Korea’s Perception of Japan 
As could be expected from any non-native colony, Japan’s attempt to forcefully 
assimilate Koreans was not well received by many Koreans. Koreans defied Japanese 
colonial rule through both overt and covert actions. In late 1939, the Japanese government 
issued the Name Order whereby Koreans were forced to change their names to a Japanese 
one.161 Names that were changed, however, secretly held relevance to identity such as 
where Koreans lived or what their heritage was.162 Koreans were forced to conduct daily 
worship at Japanese Shinto shrines.163 Some would go to the Shinto shrines, but not bow. 
Following the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, Koreans quickly burned many of the 
shrines.164 To avoid being mobilized as “comfort women,” or sex slaves serving Japanese 
Imperial troops, many young female Koreans would get married, hide with their families, 
or simply run away.165 Some Koreans organized underground church meetings, would 
pretend to be compliant with Japanese orders, but do shoddy work, while others would 
work at a slower and inefficient pace. Still, other Koreans covertly hid national flags.166 
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Japan’s attempt to spread Japanese nationalism and unify the Korean colony through forced 
assimilation failed miserably in the end. Following the defeat of Japan in WWII, both North 
and South Korea banned Japanese films, videos, and books. 167  Rather than achieve 
Japanese national unity on the Korean peninsula, with each act of opposition to Japanese 
rule, Koreans fomented a sense of their own nationalism that carried them through the 
thirty-five years of oppressive foreign colonialism. 
3. Western Perception of the Japanese 
Many people found the Japanese people and their culture difficult to understand. 
By several Western accounts, Japan was a unique nation. According to American 
anthropologist, John Embree, “Japan and the Japanese are different from other nations, or 
rather, as Japanese nationalists phrase it, they are ‘unique among the peoples and cultures 
of the world.’”168 English officer Compton Pakenham described Japan as “an absolutely 
unique nation…utterly different from any other in the world.”169 U.S. military officers 
describe the Japanese as “strange, inscrutable, and peculiar,” and who “neither look, think, 
nor act like other people on earth.”170 WWII journalist Ernie Pyle reported “the Japanese 
were looked upon as something subhuman and repulsive; the way some people feel about 
cockroaches and mice.”171 Not fully understanding the Japanese people and their culture 
naturally intimidated Western powers because they were different and because Westerners 
seemed to be uncertain of what Japanese people’s true intentions were when they would 
interact with them. 
Until the 1930s, Western powers dictated Japanese diplomacy in an effort to contain 
Japan. American leaders regarded Japanese immigration to the United States at the turn of 
the twentieth century as an extension of Japanese imperialism. Therefore, lawmakers 
instituted the California Alien Land Law of 1913, “limiting leases of agricultural lands to 
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maximum terms of three years and barring further land purchases by Japanese aliens.”172 
In addition, American President Woodrow Wilson opposed Japanese territorial claims in 
China and his Fourteen Points proclamation at Versailles about self-determination seemed 
to apply “only to Japan’s wartime acquisition of Shandong.”173 Great powers allowed 
Japan to enter the League of Nations (LoN), but used the LoN as a means to constrain 
Japan from “overt aggression and militaristic expansion in China.”174 
Because some American leaders viewed Japan as a competitor in the Far East, 
Washington also convened the Washington Conference where Japan agreed to sign naval 
treaties that were designed to eliminate any form of a “naval race in capital ships that could 
threaten American interests in the Pacific.”175 Some Western historians credit Japanese 
foreign policy in the 1930s as “a search for freedom of action in East Asia from an 
international order dominated by the United States and Britain.”176 At the same time, other 
military and professional observers believed Japan and its military to be “no better than a 
class-C nation.”177 
Japan approached nation-building with a vigor and determination to quickly gain 
equality with Western powers. To achieve this parity, Japan focused a vast amount of 
energy in building up its military. It embedded a militaristic nationalist ideology within its 
educational system and incorporated Shinto ideas of racial superiority with government 
policy. Japan’s obsession to be recognized as a first-class nation and equal among great 
powers, along with its goal of hegemony in East Asia, threatened Western power and 
influence in the region and drove them to take actions that would check Japanese 
imperialism. 
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B. CHINA’S RISE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Unlike Japan’s militaristic approach to national unity and nation building, China is 
spreading nationalism mainly through economic expansionism. Since becoming President 
of the CCP in 2012, Xi Jinping has placed an enormous amount of focus on elevating 
China’s status so that it may once again take its place among great powers. This means 
building up its military might and ensuring nationalism amongst a population made up of 
more than fifty ethnic groups. In turn, China therefore needs to develop its economy 
because a “powerful economy will pay for the strong military required for self-defense.”178 
Recently, developing China’s economy has become synonymous with Xi’s national vision 
to realize the “China Dream.”179 China’s OBOR initiative is perhaps the most ambitious 
strategy and tool being used for spreading nationalism. In the end, the “China Dream,” if 
successful, will create a network of roads, rails, and sea lanes uniting the people of China 
together and connecting surrounding and distant nations with “all roads literally leading 
back to China.”180 
1. China’s One Belt, One Road Plan 
Beijing appears transparent regarding OBOR’s purpose. On October 2, 2013, 
President Xi Jinping, addressing the Indonesian Parliament, declared that the mission 
behind OBOR, then referred to collectively as the “Maritime Silk Road of the 21st 
Century”181 and the “Silk Road Economic Belt,”182 was five-fold: to “build trust and 
develop good-neighborliness,” “work for win-win cooperation,” “stand together and assist 
each other,” “enhance mutual understanding and friendship,” and to “stick to openness and 
inclusiveness.” 183  The OBOR initiative will help promote “national 
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rejuvenation…cementing the country’s place as a leading world power” 184  as China 
overcomes economic and national challenges. President Xi later articulated that OBOR 
will “gradually form overall regional cooperation,” creating a region where neighboring 
nations will “share peace and development as long as they persist in unity and mutual trust, 
equality and mutual benefit, mutual tolerance and learning from each other, as well as 
cooperation and win-win outcomes.”185 Chinese Vice Premier, Zhang Gaoli, reiterated 
Xi’s OBOR vision at the 2017 Media Cooperation Forum, attended by media personnel 
representing 126 nations, and the positive role media could play in “promoting [OBOR’s] 
essence and spirit.”186 OBOR will enhance trade flow across Asia, Europe, and Africa, 
stimulating regional economic growth and development. At the same time, OBOR will 
“upgrad[e] Chinese industry while exporting Chinese standards.”187 
Beijing claims building OBOR will help minimize national security threats and 
bring more stability to poverty-stricken regions across China.188 For example, in Xinjiang 
province, radical Islamism continues to spread and is the primary source of terrorism in 
China, 189  making it more difficult to ensure the safety of workers building OBOR 
infrastructure. However, Lu Shuling, former Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, asserted that 
the “construction of the Port of Gwadar is economically vital for landlocked Xinjiang” 
because it will “significantly reduce the transport costs for the province” and “tackl[e] the 
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incubator of terrorism, namely poverty.”190 If OBOR helps decrease threats to national 
security caused by terrorism, then the Chinese in those poverty-stricken regions will more 
likely support further OBOR developmental projects in forthcoming years that unite China 
and its people. 
China claims that the OBOR initiative is not a ploy to gain regional hegemony. In 
fact, China denies seeking hegemony, which it views as a “colonialist enterprise pursued 
only by devilish foreigners.” 191  On September 3, 2015, in his address given at the 
Commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of 
Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, President Xi 
stated that “no matter how much stronger it may become, China will never seek hegemony 
or expansion.”192 China’s actions, however, seem to contradict Xi’s words. Billions of 
dollars have been invested in economic infrastructure construction projects throughout 
South and Southeast Asia, such as in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Indonesia.193 
Additionally, China recently built its “first ever overseas military base in Djibouti” and 
conducted “live-fire drills in the surrounding sands under the banner of peacekeeping 
missions.”194 Building infrastructure, especially ports, in key foreign nations in Africa and 
South and Southeast Asia will provide China with greater regional maritime control and 
security. 
Apart from building national unity, some people and organizations see investing in 
OBOR wise while other do not. For foreign businesses, OBOR is expected to be a lucrative 
golden opportunity. For example, Siemens “won a US$1 billion order from China’s 
Shandong Electric Power Construction 3rd Company (SEPCOIII) for the construction of a 
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combined cycle power plant at the Ras Al-Khair Plant in Saudi Arabia.”195 Researchers 
Yeroen van der Leer and Joshua Yau assert that another reason for investing in OBOR is 
because China is seeking official recognition by the IMF of the Renminbi as a global 
reserve currency.196 President Xi has indicated that US$50 billion would be “directed at 
encouraging financial institutions to expand their overseas [R]enminbi fund 
businesses.”197 If this is true, then OBOR most definitely has opened the door for realizing 
official recognition of the Renminbi as a global reserve currency. While OBOR is 
perceived as an enormous infrastructure development program, another possibility is that 
OBOR is more realistically being used as a vehicle for driving Chinese “economic leverage 
abroad and exporting its strong infrastructure development capabilities to other 
regions.”198 Still, others believe OBOR is the means to an end for strengthening China’s 
military. Despite Xi’s announcement to reduce military forces by 300,000, 199  China 
continues to build manmade islands in the SCS containing Air Defense structures and 
military force projection capabilities. 
2. Response of International Actors to OBOR 
China has received enormous international support for developing land and sea 
routes connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa. The majority of ASEAN members encourage 
supporting OBOR. Members of ASEAN see OBOR as a means to strengthening the 
relationship between ASEAN and China. OBOR will also complement ASEAN’s Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiative to promote trade and investment, 
build infrastructure projects, as well as “remove trade barriers and create job 
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opportunities.”200 Even though OBOR is expected to make China a greater regional and 
global power, ASEAN anticipates support for OBOR will “enable China to get connected 
and gain access into ASEAN markets, and vice-versa,”201 thereby enhancing regional 
economic growth and development. 
Along the sea route for OBOR, the island state of Sri Lanka plays a strategically 
important role. Thousands of merchant ships and oil tankers have used Sri Lankan ports 
for centuries as a stopping point when traveling to and from Arabia and East Asia. Because 
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy revolves around the motto “friends with all, enemies with 
none,”202 Sri Lankan foreign minister Ravi Karunanayake proudly supports the OBOR 
initiative. That support may also have much to do with the fact that Sri Lanka needs foreign 
direct investment and China is more than willing to provide it. China’s investment to build 
up the port at Hambantota should bring the Sri Lankan government a profitable tax 
revenue.203 Subsequently, Hambantota will become a “major source of employment” and 
“drive enormous growth in trade volumes” because of lowered prices and improved supply 
chains.204 
Following the trade route back up to the subcontinent, Pakistani Prime Minister 
Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, speaking at the World Economic Forum on January 24, 2018, 
expressed how OBOR is “much more than just an infrastructure partnership.”205 For 
Pakistan, OBOR will provide “financial stability and lessening of environmental impact 
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and Pakistan being a more responsible global citizen.”206 At a one-day seminar conference 
held in Kathmandu earlier this year, Dr Rajesh Kazi Shrestha, President of Nepal China 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, stated that “[Nepal is] eager to welcome investment 
under the Belt and Road Initiative in various possible sectors like hydropower, agriculture, 
trade-related infrastructure, tourism, herbs and herbal products, natural resources and 
service sectors.”207 China has also managed to take on major port and fast-train rail 
projects in Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
China’s economic outreach stretches along its northern and western borders as well. 
Despite OBOR projects appearing to remain limited primarily to Russia’s southern 
periphery, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly 
advocated his belief in Beijing’s economic initiative. Following a nationally televised 
appearance mid-2017, Putin told reporters he hoped that “[OBOR] has paved the way for 
a new stage of cooperation in Eurasia,” and that Russia and China will “work together... 
[to] benefit both the Chinese and Russian peoples.”208 Russian and Chinese mutually 
reinforced economic ties through OBOR projects, and Putin’s hope for greater co-
prosperity, follow the establishment of the “Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 
a 2-year-old, Kremlin-conceived economic grouping of five former Soviet countries 
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan).”209 
In addition, China has gained support for OBOR from prominent European nations. 
Lord Mayor of the City of London, Charles Bowman, spoke favorably of the OBOR 
initiative earlier this year. At a China-UK Economic and Trade Forum address held by the 
China Chamber of Commerce in the UK, Bowman stated that “the City of London is the 
natural Western end to the Belt and Road Initiative, and London can contribute greatly to 
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this initiative” and that “Britain’s commitment to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative 
was reaffirmed just a few weeks ago at the 9th UK-China Economic and Financial 
Dialogue.”210 
Some countries that are connected already to the OBOR initiative have exhibited 
mixed reactions to supporting OBOR. For example, in Kazakhstan, which shares a “1,700-
plus-kilometer common border [and] more than 2,000 years of exchanges and broad 
common interests,”211 President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan referred to OBOR as having 
become “a new paradigm of regional and global development, a new scheme for co-
operation.”212 However, in 2016, street protests erupted because the Kazakh government 
proposed to “change land-ownership laws, which were widely interpreted as being a 
prelude to enabling large-scale Chinese investment in agriculture and loss of livelihood for 
Kazakh farmers.”213 
Somewhat more reserved than the UK about OBOR, German leaders have yet to 
back China’s economic dream. Speaking at the Silk Road summit held in Beijing last year, 
German Economy Minister Brigitte Zypries indicated, “Germany…would not sign a joint 
trade statement at China’s Belt and Road Forum unless they received more guarantees from 
Beijing on free trade, environmental protection and working conditions.”214 As much as 
Germany would like to support OBOR, lack of project transparency related to OBOR is 
holding German businesses back. 
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While more than sixty nations have expressed they favor the China-led OBOR 
initiative, a few major actors remain skeptical and even outright opposed to OBOR. The 
Indian government, for example, has expressed strong opposition against China’s 
ambitious project that aims to expand economic links between Africa, Asia, and Europe. 
Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, former Secretary (Economic Relations) in the External 
Affairs Ministry, argued “connectivity projects should be consultative and consequent with 
the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 215  OBOR, however, “violates 
[India’s] sovereignty given that one strand of it—the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—
passes through Pakistan- administered part of disputed Kashmir.”216 Within Australia, 
banks, law firms, and various enterprises are optimistic and view OBOR as an economic 
opportunity. 217  However, earlier this year, Australian Senator and Minister for 
International Development and the Pacific, Concetta Fierravanti-Wells “accused Beijing 
of funding useless infrastructure projects in the Pacific.” 218  In October, 2017, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense, James Mattis stated that “the U.S. is no more keen on Beijing’s 
expansive plans—nor on the language emphasising [sic] China’s leadership role. In a 
globalised [sic] world, there are many belts and roads, and no one nation should put itself 
into a position of dictating ‘one belt, one road.’”219 Further opposition to OBOR may be 
expected because of China’s recent imposition over disputed islands and reefs in the East 
and South China Seas. 
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Japan modernized and grew its military because it feared its relatively weak status 
compared to encroaching Western nations. Some Japanese leaders believed Western 
imperialism and influence could only be stopped by confrontation. Japanese nationalism 
and militarism was also deeply embedded in the nation’s education curriculum. Japan’s 
military, media, and renowned writers propagated racial superiority. Shinto orthodoxy 
inspired the same racial greatness and government officials incorporated the same 
arrogance into foreign policy decision making. Japanese leaders then encouraged citizens 
to spread the Yamato race throughout Asia. However, like most nations that have forced 
their own national influence on foreign populations, Japan was met with obvious 
opposition. Koreans both defied Japanese colonial rule and the foisting of Japanese 
nationalism upon the colonized nation. Westerners saw the Japanese people and culture as 
difficult and incomprehensible. 
Turning to China and the “Asia Dream,” President Xi asserts that nations connected 
to OBOR will build mutual trust, cooperation, equality, learning, and benefit, and that 
OBOR will help to stabilize national security threats in the region. China’s leaders claim 
they are not seeking regional hegemony. Foreign businesses are taking advantage of OBOR 
and the gainful financial prospect it provides. Regional institutions, too, are embracing the 
OBOR initiative because it promotes economic prosperity. Many peripheral states, such as 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, are optimistic about OBOR and the industrial and financial 
boost expected to result. Support for OBOR extends beyond China’s periphery and into 
Western Europe. Other nations and their businesses remain hesitant to support OBOR, or 
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Will a strong and unified national identity lead the Chinese to go to war against the 
United States? Based on the analysis conducted in this thesis, I conclude that China is not 
likely to go to war with the United States because of their nationalism. My main research 
was to determine what the main drivers of nationalism were in pre-WWII Japan and 
whether there are similar nationalist impulses in today’s China in order to suss out the 
likelihood that same pattern might lead to war. Both of my hypotheses proved true. I 
concluded that, while Japan’s nationalism was driven by military might, China’s is driven 
by economic stability. Additionally, while Japan’s goal in participating international 
institutions was to be recognized as an equally great power, and they failed due to 
encountering racism, China’s goal in participating in international institutions is to gain 
support for economic stability. China faces less potential for racism because they are 
working with their neighbors. Therefore, unless the United States antagonizes China in a 
way that demeans or destroys their goal for economic stability, China’s nationalism is 
unlikely to lead to war. However, considering other factors outside the scope of this thesis, 
like Taiwan and China’s understandable angst over its “century of humiliation,” the United 
States would be wise to tread lightly when addressing anything that impacts China’s 
economic stability, including OBOR. We do not want to shun China’s goal of economic 
stability as Western racism did for Japan’s goal, unless China oversteps certain boundaries 
or threatens U.S. national interests. 
In sum, this thesis compared Japan’s rise to power before WWII with China’s 
current rise. Chapter II analyzed how Japanese containment through treaties and its souring 
relationship with the League of Nations ultimately led to a change in Japanese foreign 
policy. Pre-WWII Japan adapted the model of Western imperialism and immediately 
focused on modernizing its military forces. Japan attempted to show Western powers that 
it, too, was a great power because of successful territorial expansion and defeat of superior 
military forces. However, instead of receiving the desired recognition, Japan was unjustly 
treated as if it was a third-rate nation. Japan sought racial equality through the League of 
Nations, but was unsuccessful. Instead, the Washington naval treaties restrained Japanese 
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imperialism and restricted Japan’s military growth. Japanese leaders resented the treaties 
signed at the Washington Conference, considering them to be unequal treaties. 
Furthermore, the Washington Conference treaties, combined with Western racism and the 
Committee of Nineteen’s verdict of illegitimate Japanese military operations for the 
Manchurian Incident, led Japan to withdraw from the LoN. Japan then isolated itself from 
international institutions, turning instead to once again building a mighty military and 
pursuing rising nationalism. Seven years later, WWII found Japan allied with Germany. 
China, on the other hand, has been successfully engaging international institutions.  
It has shifted its economic and security policy from making bilateral agreements to more 
multilateral agreements and joined regional institutions in an effort to appeal to nations on 
its periphery. By participating in ASEAN, APEC, the SCO, Six Party Talks, and ARF, 
China is minimizing traditional perceptions by neighboring states that see it as an economic 
threat. In addition, China is building regional unity through economic and security 
institutions. China’s OBOR policy is meant to increase trade and cooperation across East 
Asia, Eurasia, and Africa while simultaneously uniting the Chinese people through 
economic prosperity and stability. OBOR will encourage cultural exchanges, increase 
economic business, and strengthen Chinese soft power. China is using the AIIB and BRICS 
NDB to support OBOR and expects to internationalize the renminbi as a global reserve 
currency. Doing so will challenge the U.S. dollar and could weaken the United States’ 
economic position in Asian markets. 
Chapter III then compared Japanese and Chinese approaches to nation building as 
well as a sample of international responses. Japan rebuilt its government, adapting the 
model of Westerners but placing a greater emphasis on modernizing its military due to a 
palpable fear of Western influence and military strength. This, in turn, led some Japanese 
leaders to assume that a conflict with Western imperialism was inevitable. Japan’s national 
education system, media, and widely read authors condoned militarism and facilitated 
widespread nationalism on the premise of their own racial superiority. Facing racism from 
the West, they asserted superiority. The same vanity was practiced through Shintoism and 
integrated into foreign policy decision making. Additionally, Japan’s growing regional 
 61 
influence received some resistance. Both Westerners and colonized Koreans detested 
Japanese imperialism and its growing ethno-militaristic threat to the region. 
Turning to China, Chapter III showed that leaders are generating nationalist 
sentiments and regional dialogue because of OBOR. President Xi claims the OBOR 
initiative is not the result of hegemonic desire, but rather, so that all nations can prosper, 
be more secure from global threats, and share and learn from one another. OBOR 
development projects are enticing businesses across the globe as well as regional 
institutions. While many states on China’s periphery are optimistic about the great many 
changes that OBOR will provide, other states remain skeptical because of perceived 
ambiguity between China’s rhetoric and its actions. 
Overall, the thesis found that using international institutions did not work out for 
Japan the way they wanted it to, but that it did help tighten its national unity. Their 
nationalism as a driving force failed in the sense that Japan wanted to be recognized at the 
international level as a great power, but that failure ultimately led to Japan succeeding in 
fomenting a stronger national identity. Japan’s military, economy, and ethnicity all drove 
Japanese nationalism. Although the establishment of Manchukuo “ushered in what was 
called a golden age for Japanese industry,”220 Japan’s military stood out above the other 
two as the primary driver uniting the Japanese people. Japanese culture and ethnicity, on 
the other hand, may be better viewed as supporting drivers to nationalism. Western efforts 
to contain Japan, as noted by the Washington Conference treaties and Japan’s relationship 
with the LoN, eventually steered Japan away from global institutional cooperation and 
more toward an autarkic and militaristic foreign policy. 
Conversely, China’s economic growth may be perceived as its primary nationalist 
driver, as it works through political institutions and the OBOR initiative, with China’s 
military and culture acting as supportive drivers to nationalism. China is apparently more 
interested in achieving regional hegemony using soft power. At this point in time, China 
has prioritized gaining the trust of regional states through economic development projects 
(like OBOR) and through institutional participation over turning to hard power to 
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accomplish policy objectives. That being said, however, China continues to strengthen and 
modernize its military, which threatens the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific 
region and could also be used to challenge or replace U.S. hegemony. 
OBOR can be regarded as a major driver of China’s contemporary national unity. 
As China’s development projects come to fruition, spanning the length of the nation, its 
people can expect to see an increase in wealth and improved wellness. OBOR provides a 
clear opportunity for China’s less developed regions, most of which are situated inland, to 
connect with the more economically advanced region on China’s east coast.221 OBOR is 
also another way for China to reach out to the ethnic Chinese diaspora around the world. 
Given the size and scope of the OBOR initiative, its success would undoubtedly strengthen 
China’s economy, international position as a world leader, and military strength for the 
foreseeable future. International responses to OBOR are largely welcoming. Countries on 
China’s periphery are especially supportive of the buildup of transport infrastructure that 
is expected to facilitate more efficient cross-border trade and commerce, both by land and 
by sea. For countries with lower wage incomes, OBOR provides the option to export 
finished products directly to Europe and neighboring Asian markets without going through 
China, or to export through China as many supply chains currently do. 
China’s proactive approach to promoting economic prosperity, regional economic 
cooperation, world peace and development carries with it a weight of greater responsibility 
that China may or may not be ready to bear. As President Xi’s “China Dream” or “Asia-
Pacific Dream” of the OBOR initiative connects more than sixty-eight nations spanning 
three continents, it is possible China’s greatest challenge will lie with handling the complex 
dynamics of security and economic cooperation both within its own borders and with 
multiple nations. Specific challenges China faces within its own borders include 
cooperating with indigenous ethnic groups, such as the predominantly Muslim Uighur of 
central and western China who are believed to be harboring violent separatists. 
Additionally, on top of having an aging population that will reduce China’s available 
workforce considerably in the near future, China is also plagued with an extreme case of 
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land, water, and air pollution that will have a negative domino effect on the health of its 
citizens. Externally, China continues to face maritime disputes with nations claiming parts 
of the South and East China Seas, as well as border disputes with India.  
China’s OBOR initiative could seriously impact U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific 
region. As OBOR deep-water port projects develop in places like Sri Lanka and Pakistan, 
China will be able to increase its military strength and projection capabilities. China’s 
expanding naval presence will boost its naval influence in the region and will likely 
challenge U.S. freedom of navigation and maritime security in the South China Sea. In 
addition, U.S. partnerships and alliances will be tested. Some states that support the OBOR 
initiative, but have built strong relations with the United States over the past few decades, 
may face pressure, especially from within international institutions, to side with China’s 
growing economic ambitions. On the other hand, U.S. relations with current allies, such as 
Japan, India, and Australia, may strengthen as ways to balance OBOR are discovered. 
In response to Japan’s rise in the early twentieth century, the United States failed 
to calculate Japan’s response to Western containment and racism. To avoid a similar 
response by the Chinese, the United States and China should collaborate to strengthen 
regional stability rather than view each other as competitors. OBOR may be the ideal 
catalyst for reinforcing and building international civil and military cooperation in order to 
prevent unnecessary conflict where more than half the world’s population resides. 
Students interested in future research might investigate the progress of OBOR and 
whether OBOR’s development projects have shifted relations from current U.S. partners 
in the Asia-Pacific to China. Further research may also consider the implications for 
internationalizing the Chinese Renminbi as an alternative reserve currency to the U.S. 
dollar. Someone else might take a closer look at what drives U.S. nationalism. It seems to 
me that nationalism driven by brute force once contributed to world devastation. If we 
resist using our hard and soft power as blunt objects, instead cooperating in building, 
OBOR may help us, too. 
  
 64 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 65 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abdelhady, Hdeel. “How China’s One Belt One Road Will Open Trade Routes and Raise 
Barriers to U.S. Law.” MassPoint PLLC. May 14 2017. 
http://masspointpllc.com/china-one-belt-one-road-us-legal-dominance. 
Ajis, Mohd, Mohamad Keling, Mohamad Saludin, Md Shuib, and Hishamudin Som. 
“The Development of ASEAN from Historical Approach.” Asian Social Science 
7, no. 7 (July 2011): 169–189. 
ANI. “Belt and Road Initiative Will Pave New Opportunities for Nepal.” Last modified 
February 13, 2018. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/belt-and-road-
initiative-will-pave-new-opportunities-for-nepal201802131156190001. 
ASEAN-China Centre. “Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian 
Parliament.” October 3, 2013. http://www.asean-china-
center.org/english/201310/03/c_133062675.htm. 
Baumgartner, Pete. “China’s Massive ‘One Road’ Project Largely Bypasses Russia, but 
Moscow Still on Board.” RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. Last modified June26, 
2017. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-china-one-belt-one-road-project-putin-
xi/28579849.html. 
Beasley, William G. The Rise of Modern Japan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. 
Buckley, Thomas H. The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922. 
Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1970. 
Burkman, Thomas W. Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 
1914–1938. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008. 
Cai, Peter. Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Sydney, Australia: Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, March 2017. 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-initiative. 
Chen Jian. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001. 
China Daily. “Chinese President Proposed Asia-Pacific Dream.” November 9, 2014. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-11/09/content_18889698.htm. 
———. “Full Text: Xi’s Speech at Commemoration of 70th Anniversary of War 




Colón de Carvajal Spain Grandall Law Firm. “One Belt One Road (OBOR).” Digital 
image. Last modified March 23, 2017, https://colondecarvajal.com/en/one-belt-
one-road-obor. 
Deutsche Welle. “Germany Wants More Guarantees from China over ‘Silk Road’ Trade 
Plan.” May 14, 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/germany-wants-more-guarantees-
from-china-over-silk-road-trade-plan/a-38833936. 
Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1986. 
Duhaime, Lloyd. “1868: Charter Oath of the Five Articles.” Duhaime.org. Last modified 
June 8, 2010. http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/LawArticle-1203/1868-
Charter-Oath-of-the-Five-Articles.aspx. 
Earhart, H. Byron. Japanese Religion: Unity and Diversity, 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1982. 
Esherick, Joseph W. “China and the World: From Tribute to Treaties to Popular 
Nationalism.” In China’s Rise in Historical Perspective, edited by Brantly 
Womack, 19–38. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010. 
Frankopan, Peter. “King of the Road.” The Weekend Australian Magazine. Last modified 




Furhman, Peter. “China-owned Port in Sri Lanka Could Alter Trade Routes.” China First 
Capital in Financial Times. Last modified September 25, 2017. 
https://www.ft.com/content/f0d88070-9f99-11e7-9a86-4d5a475ba4c5.v. 
Gellner, Ernest. “The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation 
and Class.” In Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan, 98–145. New 
York: Verso, 1996. 
Giffard, Sydney. Japan Among the Powers 1890–1990. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994. 
Global Risk Insights. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Regional Outlooks for 2018.” 
January 31, 2018. https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/01/chinas-belt-and-road-
initiative-regional-outlooks-for-2018. 
Global Security “Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).” August 6, 2017. 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/sco.htm. 
 67 
Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 3rd 
ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Harris, Harry B. Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. 
Pacific Command Before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific 
Command Posture. Washington, DC: White House. February 14, 2018. 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-
Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf. 
He, Yinan. “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict.” 
Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 50 (March 2007): 1–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560601026710. 
Holtom, D.C. Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism. New York: Paragon Book Reprint 
Corp., 1963. 
Hroch, Miroslav. “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-
Building Process in Europe.” In Becoming National, edited by Geoff Eley and 
Ronald G. Suny, 60–78. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Ichijo, Atsuko and Gordana Uzelac. Introduction to When is the Nation? Towards an 
Understanding of Theories of Nationalism, edited by Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana 
Uzelac, 1–6. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War, 1931–1945. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. 
Iriye, Akira. “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status.” In The Cambridge History of Japan 
Vol. 5, edited by Marius B. Jansen, 721–782. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. 
Jayaraman, Premalatha. “OBOR Initiative to Complement RCEP.” ASEAN Post. Last 
modified August 24, 2017. https://theaseanpost.com/article/obor-initiative-
complement-rcep. 
Jiechi, Yang. “A Changing China in a Changing World.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China. February 5, 2010. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t656781.shtml. 
Johnson, Christopher K. President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” Initiative: A Practical 
Assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s Roadmap for China’s Global 
Resurgence. Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2016. https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/160328_Johnson_PresidentXiJinping_Web.pdf. 
Kang, Hildi. Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea, 1910–1945. Ithaca:
 Cornell University Press, 2001. 
 68 
Katsumata, Hiro “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a ‘Talking 
Shop’ or a ‘Norm Brewery’?” The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): 181–198. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740500473197. 
Kfir, Isaac. Understanding the BRI in Africa and the Middle East. Australia: ASPI 




Library of Congress. “Principles and Policies Concerning China (Nine-Power Treaty).” 
Accessed January 11, 2018. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-
ust000002-0375.pdf. 
———. “United States Treaties and International Agreements: 1776–1949.” Last 
modified April 18, 2017. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-
ust000002- 0375.pdf. 
Miller, Tom. China’s Asian Dream. London: Zed Books, 2017. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “President Xi Jinping 
Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with 
Central Asian Countries.” September 7, 2013. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_66568
6/t107 6334.shtml. 
Miyoshi, Masao. As We Saw Them. Berkley: University of California Press, 1979. 
Moneycontrol. “Belt and Road Initiative Much More Than Infra Partnership with China: 
Pakistan PM.” January 25, 2018. http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/world/belt-
and-road- initiative-much-more-than-infra-partnership-with-china-pakistan-
pm-2490313.html. 
Najita, Tetsuo. “Japanese Revolt Against the West: Political and Cultural Criticism in the 
Twentieth Century.” In The Cambridge History of Japan, The Twentieth Century 
Vol. 6, edited by Peter Duus, 711–774. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988. 
News Desk. “India Reiterates Opposition to China’s Belt, Road Initiative.” Eleven. Last 
modified January 19, 2018. http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/world-news/13202. 
Pakistan Today. “China Appreciates Pakistan’s Support Promoting BRI: Chinese Vice 




Pardo, Ramon P. “China and Northeast Asia’s Regional Security Architecture: The Six-
Party Talks as a Case of Chinese Regime-Building?” East Asia (2012): 337–354. 
Pyle, Kenneth B. Japan Rising. New York: Pubic Affairs, 2007. 
Qobo, Mzukisi and Mills Soko. “The Rise of Emerging Powers in the Global 
Development Finance Architecture: The Case of the BRICS and the New 
Development Bank.” South African Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 3 
(2015): 277–288. https://doi.orgg/10.1080/10220461.2015.1089785. 
Renan, Ernest. “What is a Nation?” In Becoming National, edited by Geoff Eley and 
Ronald G. Suny, 42–56. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Roche, Elizabeth. “Sri Lanka Defends Decision to Join China’s One Belt One Road 
Project.” Livemint. Last modified June 8, 2017. 
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/lZg4QfnterSduhYaIbP9sJ/Sri-Lanka-defends-
decision-to-join-Chinas-Obor-project.html. 
———. “Sushma Swaraj Voices Concern over OBOR, Terror.” Livemint. Last modified 
January 18, 2018. 
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/688iHVEUK7M4DDNZUHPRwN/Sushma-
Swaraj-voices-concern-over-Obor-terror.html. 
Rowe, William T. China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Seth, Michael. A Concise History of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to 
the Present. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010. 
Shirk, Susan L. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Smith, Anthony D. “The Origins of Nations.” In Becoming National, edited by Geoff 
Eley and Ronald G. Suny, 106–131. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
The State Council: The People’s Republic of China. “Full Text: Action Plan on the Belt 
and Road Initiative.” March 30, 2015. 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.
htm. 
Sukehiro, Hirakawa. “Japan’s Turn to the West.” In The Cambridge History of Japan 
Vol. 5, edited by Marius B. Jansen, 432–498. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. 
Tipton, Elise K. Modern Japan: A Social and Political History, 3rd ed. New York: 
Routledge, 2016. 
 70 
U.S. Department of State Archive. “The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922.” 
Accessed January 10, 2018. https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/88313.htm. 
van der Leer, Yeroen and Joshua Yau. “China’s New Silk Road.” PwC’s Growth Market
 Centre. February, 2016. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-
center/assets/pdf/china-new-silk-route.pdf. 
Wade, Geoff. “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative.” Parliament of Australia. Last 
modified February 23, 2018. 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliame
ntary_library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ChinasRoad. 
Wang, Zheng. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese 
Politics and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. 
Wilson, Sandra. “The Discourse of National Greatness in Japan, 1890–1919.” Japanese 
Studies 25, no. 1 (2005): 35–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10371390500067652. 
Xiao, Ren. “China as an Institution-Builder: The Case of the AIIB.” The Pacific Review 
29, no. 3 (2016): 435–442. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1154678. 
Young, Louise. Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime 
Imperialism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 
Yurou. “City of London Eager to be Involved in Belt and Road: Lord Mayor.” 
XINHUANET. Last modified January 19, 2018. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/19/c_136906485.htm. 
Zhao, Suisheng. “China’s Approaches Toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: 
Motivations and Calculations.” China and East Asian Regionalism: Economic 
and Security Cooperation and Institution-Building, edited by Suisheng Zhao, 1–
15. New York: Routledge, 2012. 
  
 71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
